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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the debate driving the Japanese missile 
defense system and the implications of its implementation.  This debate represents yet 
another step in Japan’s continuing trend of “normalization” and official recognition of its 
military.  This thesis analyzes the current status of the Japanese military and assesses in 
detail the factors shaping the Japanese decision to implement a ballistic missile defense 
system with the United States and its implications.  It draws conclusions and makes 
recommendations regarding possible policy alterations for the United States in response 
to Japanese implementation of a ballistic missile defense system in order to advance the 
mutual interests of the United States and Japan in the region. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The United States has a direct interest in the peace and security of the East Asian 
region.  Regional stability promotes economic prosperity, strengthening ties between the 
United States and its trading partners.  Economic prosperity encourages openness of 
countries’ economic systems which in turn encourages political openness and the spread 
of freedom throughout the area.  The spread of freedom and wealth drives opposition to 
authoritarianism, increased awareness of the responsibilities of governments to ensure 
basic human rights and in full circle, enhances peace and security in the East Asian 
region.  To maintain this stability, the United States actively works in the region through 
its projection of economic, political and military presence to deter aggression and 
promote integration. 
As the closest U.S. ally in the East Asian region, the status of Japan’s Self 
Defense Force has important implications for burden-sharing.  As Japan continues its 
eventual progression towards a military capacity unconstrained by its past and consistent 
with its economic and political power, one of the possible policy options includes a 
ballistic missile defense against nuclear and other threats posed either by North Korea or 
China.  The ballistic missile defense option is one advocated by the current Bush 
administration as part of a broader campaign of counter-proliferation and non-
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proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems that pose a threat to the 
United States and its allies.   
Any Japanese decision regarding a ballistic missile defense system will have 
important ramifications for the U.S. – Japan security relationship and the bilateral 
relationships of each country with other nations in the region.  How their decision 
regarding missile defense fits into their legal framework and interpretation thereof will 
have increasing relevance as calls for constitutional revision continue to increase.  In an 
atmosphere highlighted by the North Korean nuclear program and increasing Chinese 
power, especial attention must be paid to the changing security dynamics and the role of 
Japan in its partnership with the United States in the region. 
C. MAJOR QUESTIONS 
The major question is whether or not Japan will cooperate in a ballistic missile 
defense program with the United States.  To answer this question, it is necessary to look 
at the background of Japanese security decisions following the Second World War as 
well as debates regarding ballistic missile defense specifically.  A brief overview of the 
expansion of the roles and capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Forces and Japanese-
United States relations will be undertaken to understand important trends necessary for 
establishing the context of the missile defense debate.  Key actors, issues and events in 
the missile defense debate will be discussed to identify trends and implications.  The next 
question is how other countries in the region view the idea of a missile defense with 
Japanese participation, which will affect the Japanese notion of “comprehensive 
security,” the U.S.-Japan security relationship and U.S. interests in the area.  Lastly, what 
United States policy actions are called for in light of these possible developments? 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
The methodology used in this thesis is primarily a process-tracing analysis in 
which possible outcomes are analyzed using current and past trends regarding the 
expansion of the allowed and accepted role and capacity of Japan’s defense structure and 
ballistic missile defense.  Sources include official documents and publications by the 
Japanese government, statements by Japanese officials, and agreements between the 
United States and Japan.  News releases, past and present, supplemented by the 
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secondary writings of academic specialists are analyzed as this is an ongoing issue.  Care 
is taken to assess the differences between official positions and actual positions and 
realities, as this is an even more relevant feature of Japanese policy.  First, the 
development in roles and capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Forces following the 
First Gulf War due to participation in peacekeeping mission will be overviewed in order 
to determine any relevant trends for the missile defense debate.  This will be connected 
with the overall conduct of Japanese foreign policy followed by a detailed discussion of 
the missile defense cooperation debate between Japan and the United States as well as 
domestically in Japan.  Emphasis will be placed on trends and issues to broaden the 
applicability of this thesis. 
E. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II details the trend of expanding roles and capacities of the Japanese Self 
Defense Force (JSDF) despite of Article 9 restrictions in the Japanese Constitution.  This 
is useful in ascertaining the likelihood of Japanese missile defense system development 
as it is seen as an extension of this expansion.  It first offers a historical overview of the 
steady evolution of the JSDF during the Cold War period in coordination with its security 
alliance with the United States.  It then focuses on the Post-Cold War development of the 
JSDF and the surrounding legal framework in response to world developments with 
specific focus on how Japan’s involvement in international peacekeeping efforts has 
accelerated this development.  Of particular note is how debates and decisions regarding 
the deployment of the Self Defense Forces are a serious indicator of Japan’s 
normalization efforts.   
Chapter III analyzes trends in Japanese foreign relations from the post-World War 
II timeframe until the present in order to understand the context of Tokyo’s security 
decisions.  The chapter begins by summarizing Japan’s relations with the United States 
during the Cold War followed by an explanation of the Japanese notion of comprehensive 
security.  The Post-Cold War section of the chapter is divided into Japanese relations 
with the Untied States and its involvement in several multilateral institutions, both 
regionally and worldwide.  Comprehensive security efforts led Japan to aggressively 
pursue regional economic leadership to create mutual dependence within the region 
during the Cold War, making Japan an important upholder of capitalism and part of the 
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United States’ Cold War effort.  After the Cold War, negative reaction to Japanese 
“checkbook diplomacy”, especially from the United States, caused Japan to expand not 
only its economic component of security, but its political and military branches as well.  
At the same time, the United States still remains Japan’s key provider of direct military 
defense and its most essential ally. 
Chapter IV deals directly with the issue of a ballistic missile defense system.  It 
begins with background on the North Korean nuclear crisis.  This ongoing event has 
provided much of the impetus for the debate regarding ballistic missile defense in Japan.  
This is followed by a discussion of North Korean and Chinese missile capabilities which 
heavily overshadow the debate as well.  After the description of the military threats 
facing Japan, an explanation of ballistic and theater missile defense precedes a discussion 
of the history of missile defense cooperation between Japan and the United States.  The 
chapter ends with a section summarizing the major factors in the current internal debate 
regarding missile defense. 
Chapter V assesses perceptions of a ballistic missile defense by key players in the 
region to analyze possible decisions and responses regarding the issue.  Included are the 
views and likely responses of South Korea, China, Taiwan, North Korea, Russia and the 
United States towards a Japanese missile defense system.  The likely course of action 
must balance the benefits gained from the support of the United States and increased 
military security with the negative perceptions held by South Korea, China and North 
Korea.  It details why Japan is still likely to pursue missile defense despite these negative 
elements. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis with a summary of relevant trends found in the 
research.  These include the implications of the willingness to relax legal considerations 
in the face of political necessity, the gradual expansion of the roles and capabilities of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces, and the responsiveness of Japanese decision makers to 
external factors, including most noticeably the security relationship with the United 
States and the threat from North Korea.  It finishes with a section discussing the broad 
policy options Washington has regarding missile defense in East Asia, which includes 
ending all plans for a theater missile defense program, an aggressive pursuit of missile
5 
defense in East Asia, or keeping the capability of missile defenses strong, but limited.  It 
explains the benefits of a missile defense system while indicating measures which would 




























II. TREND OF THE EXPANDING ROLES AND CAPACITIES OF 
THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCE 
After World War II, the Japanese constitution renounced the sovereign right of 
the Japanese nation to maintain a military establishment and the use of force as a policy 
tool.  While originally imposed upon the Japanese people, it was later embraced by the 
war-weary Japanese.  However, in 1950, the creation of the National Police Reserve of 
75,000 marked the beginning of a US-backed Cold War policy that led to the 
establishment of the Japanese Self Defense Force (SDF).  Since the failure of “checkbook 
diplomacy” during Operation Desert Storm, Japan has further increased its efforts to play 
a role in the international community, including many peacekeeping operations where 
Japanese SDF personnel were deployed, the most recent and notable being Iraq in 2004.  
This is being done as Japan’s seeks  a permanent seat on the United Nations (UN) 
Security Council, a role demanding large scale foreign policy involvement to include 
military capacity.   
This chapter will provide a brief historical background about the evolution of 
what is currently the SDF and look into the decision-making processes in response to 
international and domestic pressures that occurred during the string of deployments 
starting in the 1990s.  Taking into account the gradual “normalization” of roles and 
capabilities given to the SDF, this chapter will suggest, despite constitutional barriers and 
a general public aversion to the use of force, that the day when the amending of the 
Japanese constitution to include the right to officially maintain a military is not far-off.  
As the decision-making process in regards to defense policy hinges largely on classical 
Japanese consensus building, the change will occur sooner rather than later in the event 
of large outside pressure or an international or domestic crisis. 
A. EVOLUTION OF THE SDF THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR 
In Article 9 of the Japanese constitution adopted in 1947, the Japanese renounced 
war and the threat or the use of force.  This included the maintenance of land, sea and air 
forces and other war potential.1  However, by 1950, a National Police Reserve of 75,000 
                                                 
1 Article 9, The Constitution of Japan. 
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strong was created in response to perceived internal security threats from communism 
and subversion.  With the advent of the Korean War, American planners saw the defense 
of Japan now as an aspect of the Cold War and backed away from the vision of a purely 
pacifist Japan.  By 1952, although not providing troops, Japan was providing war 
material for the UN forces in Korea, giving the Japanese economy a large boost.  In 1951, 
the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Japan was signed, forming the 
basis for the defense relationship of the two countries.  This entailed largely the Japanese 
role under the defense umbrella of the United States in exchange for basing rights in 
Japan.  With the exception of a few instances, internal disorder was quickly settled and 
the need for these defense forces for internal security diminished, but the forces 
remained. 2   Under the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954, the Police Reserve was 
renamed the Self Defense Force and mandated the use of air, land and sea forces to 
protect the peace and security of the Japanese nation against direct and indirect 
aggression.  It was divided into three components, the Ground Self Defense Force 
(GSDF), the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self Defense Force 
(ASDF).  This began the gradual buildup of Japanese forces that continues to this day.3 
In 1960, the Mutual Security Alliance was modified into the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security and met with dissatisfaction from the Japanese public, but still 
affirmed the relationship between the two countries.  As both the Japanese economy and 
American commitments in the world heightened, the “Nixon doctrine” in 1969 urged 
American allies in Asia to assume a larger share of their financial burden for defense.  Of 
important note is although the Japanese re-signed the Mutual Security Treaty in 1970, 
thus making it permanent until abrogated, they did refuse to send troops to support the 
American effort in Vietnam.4  It was also during the 1970s that Director General Sakata 
Michita of the Defense Agency implemented the 1% of the GNP restriction for the 
military budget.  In 1979, the Defense Agency began to clearly define the role of the SDF 
with six main functions, including the maintenance of an adequate surveillance posture, 
responsibility for internal security, the ability to withstand limited and small-scale 
                                                 
2 Louis D. Hayes, Introduction to Japanese Politics, Armonk: East Gate, 2001, 290-291. 
3 “Japan Defense Agency - Japan Self-Defense Force,” www.globalsecurity.org. [10 Dec 04] 
4 Duncan McCargo, Contemporary Japan, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave, 2004, 184. 
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aggression unaided, the ability of forces to utilize command communications, 
transportation, rescue and supply and maintenance, the training of SDF personnel, and a 
continuation of the Self-Defense Forces Law of 1954 and perhaps most important in the 
eye of the Japanese public, the ability to carry out disaster relief operations within the 
country of Japan.5 
The 1980s saw the prime ministership of Nakasone Yasuhiro, a former director 
general of the Defense Agency, from 1982 until 1987.  This period continued the growing 
role of the Japanese SDF as Nakasone advocated the responsibility of defending sea lanes 
within 1,000 nautical miles of Japanese shores, the Mid-Term Defense Estimate which 
was a shift away from minimalist defense capabilities toward more defensive power, and 
the abrogation of the 1% limit on defense spending.  While he was able to implement a 
more active defense policy in terms of the SDF in part due to his close relationship with 
American President Ronald Reagan, he was still unable to successfully back measures for 
amending the Constitution, upgrading the Defense Agency to a ministry, revise the 
security treaty with the United States, or dramatically increase defense spending.6  All the 
same, he was able to introduce more debate over the SDF within Japan and continue the 
trend of its expanding role.  Throughout the 1980s, public opinion also grew in support of 
the SDF, with 58% approving the defense budget in 1987 that broke the 1% limit.  Also, 
according to a 1988 survey, over half the people polled voiced an interest in the SDF and 
over 76 percent said they were favorably impressed.  While recognizing its main goal 
was national security, 77% felt it was best utilized in disaster relief.  Consequently, the 
SDF engaged heavily in civic action and disaster relief with broad public support.7 
B. EARLY DEPLOYMENTS ABROAD AFTER THE COLD WAR 
In the years after the Cold War, Japan continued its evolution in roles for the 
SDF.  To better understand this phenomenon, it is important to look at both the actions 
and the interpretations of the legal framework for instances regarding SDF deployment.  
The United States-led and UN sponsored action against Iraq in response to Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was an opportunity for Japan to demonstrate to the 
                                                 
5 Hayes, 291. 
6 McCargo, 185-196. 
7 “Japan Defense Agency - Japan Self-Defense Force,” www.globalsecurity.org. 
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world its role in the international community.  Especially relevant was Japan’s status as 
an economic superpower and its heavy reliance on Middle Eastern oil.  International 
opinion, especially in the United States, urged Japan to contribute at the bare minimum 
logistical support.  The response of Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki was to ban all oil 
imports from Iraq and propose several billion dollars worth of funding, the sending of 
medical personnel and civilian logistical support.  To better enable this action, the Kaifu 
government sought to pass a UN Peace Force Co-operation Bill where personnel from the 
SDF would comprise a Peace Co-Operation Corps.  They would no longer be technically 
considered members of the SDF while still receiving benefits and would be limited 
strictly to non-combat roles such as election monitoring, the supervision of cease-fires, 
logistics, medical activities and telecommunications.  This was all said to be at the behest 
of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro.  However, not 
only did the public have doubts with only 21% in favor of the bill and only 15% in favor 
of SDF deployment overseas, but the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP), the Komeito and 
the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) were highly critical of this bill.  Even the LDP was not 
firmly behind this legislation, and it was decided that a 13 billion dollar sum, a total over 
four times greater the annual UN peacekeeping budget, would be given to the coalition in 
the Gulf and no troops deployed.8  This made Japan a non-contributing partner in terms 
of personnel during the only two instances of direct UN-sponsored uses of force, the 
other being the Korean War.  After the cease-fire, Japanese minesweepers were sent to 
the Gulf, but this action was considered “too little too late” by the international 
community, which greatly criticized Japan for its “checkbook diplomacy.”9    Even 
though the peacekeeping bill failed, its introduction does represent at least a critical 
juncture where serious debate was conducted for SDF deployment.  Despite criticism 
over the late and minimal contributions in minesweeping made by the MSDF, the fact 
that parliamentary approval was obtained for an SDF deployment for purposes other than 
ceremonies and joint operations with the United States is another instance of a liberal 
interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution. 
                                                 
8 J. A. A. Stockwin, Governing Japan, 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, 72-75. 
9 Ibid., 76-77. 
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The Japanese response to international criticism was significant.  Public opinion 
itself began to shift in favor of the deployment of SDF personnel for peacekeeping 
operations, moving from 15% in 1990 to about 68% in 1992.10  Coupled with this swing 
in public opinion were the efforts of the aforementioned Ozawa in compromising with 
the Komeito and the DSP to accept an International Peace Cooperation bill.  The JSP was 
still adamantly opposed to the bill on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the SDF itself 
and used the “cow-walking” tactic in an unsuccessful bid to prevent the measure from 
passing.  In the light of public opinion, this was a largely unpopular move.  While the 
compromise would lead to a splintering of the LDP later on, it was successful in 
implementing into law a profound effort by the Japanese government to deploy SDF 
personnel around the world.11  The specifics of the International Peace Cooperation Law 
stated five principles regarding SDF personnel deployment in UN peacekeeping 
operations and represented the compromise necessary to gain consensus on the bill.  
These included that all parties agree to a cease-fire, all parties and host nations consent to 
UN peacekeeping operations and Japan’s participation in those operations, operations 
should remain impartial, the Japanese government may withdraw SDF members if it feels 
the first three principles are no longer in effect, and the use of weapons is limited to 
protect the lives of SDF personnel.  In addition, any deployment required Diet approval 
and the law itself was subject to review in three years.  Though the bill allowed the SDF 
to perform the “assignments of core units” for peacekeeping such as supervision of 
combatant disarmament, the use of personnel in patrolling buffer zones, and the 
collection and disposal of abandoned weapons, a “freeze” was placed on these duties 
because consensus could not be reached.12   Thus the legal framework shifted from 
forbidding the deployment of SDF personnel outside of Japan for peacekeeping 
operations to allowing it in the instances of a ceasefire and only for non-combatant roles 
in a narrow range of circumstances. 
                                                 
10 Ishizuka Katsumi, “The Evolution of Japan’s Policy towards UN Peace Operations,” paper 
presented at the Fifteenth Annual Meeting for the Academic Council on the UN System (ACUNS), at 
Cascais, Portugal, 21-23 June 2002, 11. 
11 Hayes, 78-79. 
12 “Japan’s Contributions to International Peace,” International Peace Cooperation Headquarters, 
http://www.pko.go.jp/PKO_E/pref_e.html#5rules. [11 Dec 04] 
12 
The new law was put to the test over the next several years with the deployment 
of SDF personnel to Cambodia during UNTAC in September of 1992, Mozambique in 
support of ONUMOZ in 1993, Zaire and Tanzania to support the Rwandan mission 
UNAMIR in 1994, and the Golan Heights to support UNDOF in 1996. 13   The 
deployment to Cambodia of over 600 troops was a large psychological step in response to 
international criticism, if not necessarily in terms of contribution.  It also brought to light 
important issues regarding effective coordination between the SDF and UN-sponsored 
forces.  Of special importance was, despite a breakdown in the cease-fire and hence a 
violation of the five principles, the Japanese government did not pull out the SDF, even 
after the death of two personnel.  This was further emphasized when several police 
officers abandoned their posts in protest.  Another issue was the limits placed on the use 
of force.  SDF members could only use weapons in their own self defense, while UN 
forces could defend themselves as well as use force to remove obstacles to completion of 
mission objectives.  At the same time, the SDF engineering troops engaged in patrolling, 
securing election monitoring, and transporting ballot boxes, all of which were part of the 
“frozen” duties not allowed to SDF personnel at that time.14 
The other missions were undertaken more in response to internal pressures, 
notably by Ozawa or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is unofficially motivated by 
the idea of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.  ONUMOZ saw the 
introduction of SDF members into staff positions unlike UNTAC, and the deployment to 
Zaire and Tanzania to support UNAMIR was significant for two reasons.  The first is that 
it took place outside of Rwanda because there was not a cease-fire in accordance with the 
five principles.  The second is that it was a purely voluntary mission not requested by the 
Secretary General of the UN or a joint venture with a coalition of other nations, which 
shows Japanese willingness to now support missions of their own volition and where a 
cease-fire has not been signed before the sending in of troops.15   
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The sending of SDF troops to the Golan Heights in support of UNDOF at the start 
of 1996 is important because it emphasizes how deeply domestic political policy is 
important in shaping the issue.  The debate over the deployment began in 1995, a 
tumultuous year with regards to defense policy.  The Kobe earthquake and the Aum 
Shinri Kyo sarin gas attacks put the SDF under fire for poor handling of disaster relief in 
regards to the earthquake and collaboration of some members of the SDF with the Aum 
Shinri Kyo.16  Since the LDP’s fall in 1993, it had to resort to coalition building with 
other factions, which was reflected in defense policy.  The National Defense Program 
Outline was rewritten to replace the one from 1976 and was a vague compromise.  Issues 
like the ban on collective self-defense and arms exports were left out at the request of the 
LDP, perhaps reflecting in part concern over the previous year when Japan refused an 
American request for Japanese help in regards to possible hostilities with North Korea in 
1994.  On the other hand, Social Democratic Party (SDP) which was composed of former 
JSP members was able to gain large cuts in the increases of defense spending and 
acquisitions proposed for the next four years.  It was in this political climate the debate 
over sending SDF troops to the Golan Heights took place, and opposition parties like the 
SDP delayed it from occurring for about a year.  In the end, it was given approval, but not 
without a continuation of the “freeze” in the International Peace Cooperation Law and the 
stipulation that any withdrawal of SDF personnel would be made solely by Japanese 
officials.  Furthermore, SDF personnel were restricted from duties requiring the use of 
weapons nor would they transport weaponry or armed troops of other nations.17  In 
effect, this reflected the political reality of “one step forward, half-step back” in regards 
to significant changes in the role of the SDF.  Despite the watered-down nature of the 
final mission, it is still an evolution as it does mean the existence of troops in the Middle 
East.  This is significant not only because of how the region is prone to violence, but also 
because of Japanese dependency on Middle Eastern oil. 
The above series of peacekeeping operations highlighted several features as well 
as inconsistencies of Japanese policy put into implementation.  The first is the 
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deployment of SDF personnel to UNTAC was largely a response to international 
criticism whereas the others are more the result of internal pressure and maneuverings.  
The second is the insistence on adhering to some of the principles of the 1992 
International Peace Cooperation Law while ignoring others, hindering cooperation efforts 
between Japan and other nations.  The third is the continuation of only incremental 
increases in the role of the SDF in the absence of significant international pressure or 
events. 
C. CHANGING LEGAL DYNAMICS 
After the sending of troops to the Golan Heights in January of 1996, no new 
peacekeeping or humanitarian aid involving SDF personnel was performed until 1999 in 
support of East Timorese refugees.  However, the debate and legislation during this time 
was very important in the ongoing evolution of the SDF.  In 1996, American President 
Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the security relationship 
between the two countries and set about a reevaluation of the defense guidelines from the 
late 1970s.  The new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines were completed in 1997 and 
reflected concerns over the post-Cold War situation, to include the impact of the Gulf 
War, possible nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and China’s rising presence in 
Asia.18    The new guidelines added to what was allowed for Japanese cooperation 
including broadened acknowledgement of various normal and peacetime operations to 
include disaster relief, peace keeping operation, humanitarian operations and more 
information sharing.  It also dealt with principles regarding an attack against Japan itself, 
giving Japan primary responsibility to deal with internal matters.  Even more importantly, 
it dealt with events or crises not just in Japan, but also in “surrounding areas,” which 
broadens the definition of the traditional bare minimum for defense capability.19   
Many of the above changes were seen as outside the framework of the 
Constitution and legislation was introduced to provide a legal basis for them, as there was 
outside pressure since it was already worked out with the United States.  The debate over 
the guidelines led to the passing of several laws and measures, including the Regional 
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Contingency Security Law, a revision of the 1954 Self Defense Force Law, the 
Surrounding Areas Emergency Law and the Maritime Intercept Operations Law and the 
beginnings of a five-year review and debate over revising the Constitution in February 
2000. 20   This gave guidance on how Japanese forces may assist U.S. forces in an 
emergency in the area around Japan, the ability to conduct Search and Rescue, Maritime 
Intercept Operations and Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations during rear-area 
support, giving the SDF more roles in supporting the defense relationship with the United 
States.  Another change of special import is that the International Peace Cooperation Law 
was amended in 1998 in recognition of problems brought up over the past years of 
Japanese experience in peacekeeping operations.  Included changes were the allowance 
of election monitoring activities by regional organizations other than the United Nations, 
the removal of the requirement of a cease-fire in humanitarian operations involving the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and the use of weapons whenever their superiors 
ordered them to.21  The introduction of serious debate in amending the Constitution 
represents a serious shift in domestic Japanese political thinking, partly in response to 
internal pressures as well as outside international pressure. 
D. RECENT DEPLOYMENTS TO THE PRESENT 
SDF personnel were sent to Indonesia in support of East Timorese refugees in 
1999-2000, partly thanks to the modification of the International Peace Cooperation 
Law.22 The continued presence of Japanese peacekeeping efforts in the world was to pay 
off later, and the clearly defining instance in recent years was the September 11th attack 
against the United States.  Immediately following, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi, 
whose prime ministership has seen the largest advances towards the de jure and de facto 
enlargement of SDF roles, called for Japanese action and soon the MSDF sent carriers to 
conduct intelligence operations in the Indian Ocean.  In addition, the Anti-Terrorism 
Special Measures Law was passed with around only a month of debate and the 
International Peace Cooperation Law was modified once again.  The Anti-Terrorism 
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Special Measures Law is remarkable not only for its unprecedented speed of passage, but 
in that it allows the SDF to support combat actions in non-combatant roles for the first 
time in its history, even if it is limited mostly to logistics and intelligence.  Furthermore, 
it extends this capacity to nations other than the United States and allows SDF personnel 
to use weapons to protect not just themselves, but those under their care.  It also allowed 
SDF members to provide humanitarian relief to countries still in conflict with host nation 
consent, which is a step further than the International Peace Cooperation Law at that 
time.23  The quickness to reach consensus showed the impact international pressure had 
on the domestic debate of defense policy.  In addition, Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
popularity played a large role in enabling him to push through measures as well.  Surveys 
of Japanese intellectuals and constitutional scholars during this time period showed over 
65% in favor of a revision of the Constitution, over 50% affirming the constitutionality of 
the SDF, and 60% believing in Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense.24  When 
operations were conducted in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, it was a debatable 
participation in collective security, but there was relatively little international concern, 
perhaps due to psychologically visible Japanese peacekeeping efforts by the SDF. 
The amendment of the International Peace Cooperation Law was undertaken to 
allow a Japanese presence for Afghanistan peacekeeping efforts, to alleviate some 
concerns over past peacekeeping experiences and to provide the extension of some 
benefits of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law to peacekeeping efforts.  As 
evidence of the consensus on this bill, it was supported by all the leading coalition parties 
as well as the largest opposition party.  One important aspect was the lifting of the 
“freeze” on core peacekeeping activities, meaning SDF personnel could now supervise 
combatant disarmament, use personnel in patrolling buffer zones, and collect and dispose 
of abandoned weapons.  Also included was the ability of SDF members to use force to 
protect those under their care in addition to self-defense and the use of weapons to protect 
arms stores.25  The deployments of SDF personnel to Pakistan for Afghanistan refugee 
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relief and to East Timor took advantage of the new and amended laws and were yet 
another broadening of the permissible use of the SDF overseas.   
The latest in deployments for the SDF is the sending of troops to Kuwait and Iraq 
in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and peacekeeping efforts there.  The decision was 
made on December 9, 2003 by Prime Minister Koizumi and planned for activities 
centered around the city of Samawah in southeastern Iraq.26  As of December 9, 2004, 
the Iraqi mission is extended for at least another year.  As backing for his decision, 
Koizumi emphasized the non-combatant nature of the deployment and the gratitude of the 
Iraqi government and citizenry.27  While Koizumi has been able to push the deployment 
of troops to Iraq, he has faced stiffer opposition from many fronts in the absence of an 
immediate crisis or external pressure to lend his cause support. 
E. TRENDS AND SUMMARY 
Examining the trends behind the laws governing the deployment of the SDF 
overseas and the actual deployments themselves demonstrates a slow incremental trend 
towards an increase in the role and capabilities of the SDF punctuated by periods of fast 
development due to outside, foreign pressure, largely from the United States.  Starting 
from the First Gulf War, the SDF went from not being able to be deployed overseas for 
peacekeeping operations to being able to support peacekeeping operations in a very 
limited capacity.  Since the International Peace Cooperation Law was passed in 1992, this 
role has expanded in terms of capability and support as agreements with the United States 
or peacekeeping operations began to highlight inadequacies of current interpretations of 
Article 9 and push the envelope towards change.  After 9/11, momentum was gathered 
and the SDF was enabled to support combat operations in a non-combative capacity and 
recent deployments to the Middle East.  This points to the large extent of flexibility with 
which the Constitution is interpreted.   
The continual evolution in roles for the SDF causes the issue of amending the 
Constitution to loom even larger in the minds of policy makers and the Japanese public, 
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whether or not they support the roles of the SDF or even the existence of the SDF itself.  
Despite public support for the SDF’s role in peacekeeping operations, there is still a 
societal aversion to the use of force and the establishment of a military in official terms, 
at least.  On the political side, Koizumi and the LDP are the main backers of expanding 
the role of the SDF and amending the Constitution to abolish Article 9.  The Komeito is 
in alignment with the LDP and supports UN peacekeeping operations, but they wish to 
have ten years of consensus before an amendment takes place.  The socialist and 
communist parties are against a large role for the SDF to varying degrees.  The SDP, 
despite recognition of the SDF during its coalition with the LDP back in 1993, is strongly 
against the existence of the SDF and interprets Article 9 in a very strict sense.  The DPJ 
supports the SDF, but only at the classic “bare minimum for self-defense” and is against 
collective-defense or any operations outside of strictly defending Japanese territory.  The 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) is against the SDF, saying it is unconstitutional.28   
Judging from past trends, the highly contentious nature of the issue makes it 
unlikely that a firm decision will be made in the absence of either a large international 
crisis or one faced by Japan domestically, most likely in the form of a terrorist attack.  
The other main international concerns, security or otherwise, remain the same as they 
have for the past decade, namely China’s tipping of the strategic balance in Asia, North 
Korean nuclearization and the reunification of the Koreas, the U.S.-Japan security 
relationship and Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
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III. JAPANESE COLD WAR AND POST-COLD WAR SECURITY 
RELATIONSHIPS 
The development of Japanese security relationships during and after the Cold War 
is a reflection of both United States security concerns and the Japanese notion of 
comprehensive security.  The imposition of Article 9 in the Japanese “peace constitution” 
resulted in both the Japanese looking to the United States as the provider of its primary 
defense umbrella and having to resort to other means than strictly defense matters in its 
pursuit of security.  Consequently, during the Cold War, Japan focused upon economic 
measures and sought a position of economic leadership within Asia.  At the same time, a 
gradual increase in the roles of defense capabilities in Japan occurred, largely through 
negotiations of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.  After the Cold War, Japan has 
sought more leadership in the international community through multilateral organizations 
after being roundly criticized for its “checkbook diplomacy” during the First Gulf War.  
However, its support for the U.S.-Japan security relationship has remained, especially in 
recent years during the ongoing Global War on Terrorism. 
A. JAPANESE COLD WAR RELATIONS 
Japanese security relations during the Cold War can be analyzed by looking at 
how Japan’s bilateral relations with the United States shaped its security policy, broader 
trends in its notion of comprehensive security which hinged largely on low-key economic 
leadership efforts in Asia, and bilateral relations with other countries, notably China and 
South Korea. 
1.  United States – Japan Relations 
It is impossible to discuss Japanese Cold War Security Policy without examining 
first the bilateral relationship between Japan and the United States.  The imposition of a 
new constitution in 1947 by the United States left Japan with a legacy that shapes their 
foreign policy to this very day: the inability, in principle at least, to maintain military 
forces.  Under Article 9 it declared “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes...land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential will never 
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be maintained.  The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”29  This was 
an effort by the United States to prevent any sort of military resurgence by Japan in the 
future.  However, the escalation of the Cold War, especially emphasized by the Korean 
War saw American policy makers viewing Japan as integral piece of the defense puzzle 
in Asia against communist incursion around the region.  In 1950, a National Police 
Reserve of 75,000 strong was established largely to replace American troops that left for 
Korea and to resolve internal disputes and guard against communist subversion, a great 
worry during the latter half of the Occupation.  While Japan did not contribute soldiers to 
the Korean War, it actually benefited from the production of material used to support the 
war effort, giving its economy a boost.  By 1951, the Mutual Security Treaty between the 
United States and Japan was signed, placing Japan firmly under the defense umbrella of 
the United States in exchange for basing rights in Japan.30  With the Self-Defense Forces 
Law of 1954, the remaining Police Reserve was termed the Self Defense Force and 
mandated the use of air, land and sea forces to protect the peace and security of the 
Japanese nation against direct and indirect aggression.31  In this manner, after only a few 
years of the imposition of Article 9, Japan began its somewhat contradictory maintenance 
of a military force at the behest of American policy makers. 
The renegotiation of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1960, despite the political 
storminess of the debate beforehand gave Japan less of an unequal standing with the 
United States, as it represented a treaty between two nations instead of an occupied 
nation and its occupier.  The “internal disturbance clause” which gave American troops 
freedom to act in the event of an externally motivated internal threat to Japanese security 
and the inability of Japan to grant a third power basing rights without the consent of the 
United States were both allowed to expire.  On the other hand, a new “prior consultation” 
clause allowed more flexibility by allowing either Japan or the United States to initiate 
consultation when Japanese or Far East security is threatened or simply “from time to 
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time”.32  Further revision of the treaty in 1970 saw the negotiated reversions of many 
U.S. holdings back to Japan, including the controversial U.S. possession of Okinawa. 
At the same time, there were also other changing dynamics in the U.S.-Japan 
relationship.  Even as the United States sought to make Japan an economic bulwark 
against communism, in 1965, the Japanese started to experience a trade surplus with the 
United States.  While Japan supported the United States war effort in Vietnam through 
basing rights and materials, they did not send any troops.  Furthermore, the Guam 
Declaration by Nixon in 1969 that stated American allies should take it upon themselves 
to increase their share of the defense burden coupled with the Nixon visit to China in 
1971 without Japanese consultation and the later American withdrawal from Vietnam led 
Japanese policy makers to reconsider complete reliance upon the United States for 
defense issues.  The floating of the American dollar off the gold standard in 1971 and the 
ten percent surcharge on Japanese imports into America was also another shock. 33  
Reflecting these changes, as well as statements such as those uttered by the American 
Secretary of Defense in 1975 that Japan was guilty of a mere “passive defense”, Japan 
began to shoulder more of the economic burden of its defense.  The Guidelines for Japan-
United States Defense Cooperation in 1978 also expanded the role of the Self-Defense 
Forces and the Japanese role in security issues to some extent.34   
The 1980s saw the close relationship between American president Ronald Reagan 
and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, popularly termed the “Ron-Yasu” 
relationship.  While not entirely successful in changing actual conditions, Nakasone took 
large steps to change the perspective on Japanese security policy.  Statements openly 
referring to Japan as a “giant aircraft carrier”, expanding Japanese responsibility to sea-
lanes within 1,000 nautical miles of Japan, and emphasizing a shift from “absolute 
minimal response capability” to a more substantial capability were all symbolic of the 
attitude change during his prime ministership.  It was also under his watch that the 
traditional one percent of the GNP limit on military spending put in place by the Sato 
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administration was officially lifted.35  Despite these gains, little actually changed from 
the trend of gradual expansion of the Japanese role in providing for their own defense. 
The relationship between Japan and the United States during the Cold War can be 
summarized in three main stages.  During the early Occupation, the United States wished 
Japan to have a very low international presence in security matters.  However, after the 
Cold War really started to emerge, they began to pressure Japan to assume a large role 
both in economic and security terms.  The 1970s saw an even further expansion of 
Japanese security efforts, both with the United States and without, largely through the 
notion of comprehensive security.  Despite divergences over economic matters, the 1980s 
saw a resurgence of the U.S.-Japan security relationship during the “Ron-Yasu” period. 
2.  Japanese Notion of Comprehensive Security 
Because of the limits on Japan’s ability to provide for its security in strictly 
military terms, Japan embraced a strategy that included political, economic and military 
dimensions in its concept of security, with most of the emphasis on economic measures.  
Seeking to quickly overcome the stigma associated with Japanese aggression during 
World War II, it sought quickly to negotiate reparation payments to countries in the 
region.  Burma was paid in 1954, the Philippines in 1956, Indonesia in 1958, Laos and 
Cambodia in 1959, Thailand in 1962 and South Korea in 1965.  Of important note, Japan 
was allowed to give these payments in goods and services rather than the initial proposals 
of divvying out Japan’s industrial base.36  These were also attempts to promote a free 
trade system amenable to the Japanese economy as these reparations negotiations also 
included the establishment of formal trade relations.  Another step towards improving 
relations with the rest of the world was the Tokyo Olympics in 1964, which apart from 
furthering Westernization in Japan, also served to promote goodwill and a more positive 
image of Japan in the world’s view. 
After the “oil shocks” and the “Nixon shocks” in the 1970s, Japan sought to 
further expand its roles in foreign policy that were independent of the United States but 
not necessarily counter to U.S. interests.  One excellent example of this is the efforts 
initiated by prime mister Fukuda in 1977 during a visit to Southeast Asia, proposing 
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$1.55 billion in economic assistance and the promotion of Japanese involvement in 
ASEAN activities.  This was meant to satisfy the Japanese need for markets overseas and 
natural resources while helping the economic development of Southeast Asian countries.  
After the mid-1980s, Japan shifted emphasis from pure natural resources to 
manufacturing.  By 1990, the Japanese share of foreign direct investment in countries like 
Indonesia and Thailand ranged between twenty-five and fifty percent.  This kind of aid 
was a type of omni-directional foreign policy that sought to place the rest of Asia in a 
state of economic dependence and interdependence with Japan.  More cynical analysts 
accused Japan of an economic neo-colonialism, noting that much of the Japanese efforts 
seemed similar to their previous vision of a Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.37  
The type of overseas development aid (ODA) given by Japan to other countries 
highlighted the focus of comprehensive security policy.  Starting in the 1960s, Japan 
became a significant donor nation and with the Fukuda doctrine, made Japan the largest 
by 1989.  However, instead of primarily giving large amounts of grants to very poor 
developing countries, many of the recipients were actually countries with relatively high 
living standards that could readily be converted into or have an expansion of the Japanese 
overseas market.  Furthermore, the aid is often in the form of development loans instead 
of grants, giving Japan literal returns on investments.38  This sort of pragmatic charity 
served to boost Japan’s economy and international standing while still keeping a 
relatively low profile.  Japan also claims that their heavy investment in the Asian region 
was a prime factor in defeating Cold War communism by spreading market practices and 
capital development. 
3.  Bilateral Relations with China and South Korea 
Japanese relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and South Korea 
are important to understand because Japan’s role in serving as the northern anchor in 
American Asian policy created a framework that influenced the development of 
relationships with these countries during the Cold War.  The specific development with 
each country demonstrates the degrees of rigidity and flexibility that Japanese policy 
makers were able to exercise within this framework. 
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a.  Sino-Japanese Relations 
The communist nature of the PRC’s government made formal ties with 
Japan an impossibility and early relations between the two took the form of economic 
agreements.  When the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951 which ended the 
U.S. occupation in 1952, Japan was pressured by the U.S. into signing a peace treaty with 
Taiwan.  The bilateral Republic of China-Japan Treaty of 1952 announced the end of 
hostilities between Japan and China, and in effect, recognized Taipei as the official 
government of China.  This affront to Beijing prompted a series of negotiations between 
Japan and the PRC that resulted in four “unofficial” trade agreements between the two 
countries during the 1950s.  An important factor during these negotiations was the ability 
of the PRC to take advantage of some pro-Chinese sentiment within Japan.  This trade 
was temporarily halted when the Chinese claimed a slight to the Chinese flag was 
committed at a Nagasaki trade fair in 1958.  The trade did not resume until the 1960s at a 
somewhat higher level than before.39 
Although the Japanese notion of comprehensive security included political 
and economic aspects, the official government policy was to separate politics and 
economics, or seikei bunri.  This enabled Japan to pursue economic agreements with as 
many countries as possible, including those on the “wrong” side of the Cold War.  More 
specifically in China’s case, unofficial trade agreements were acceptable as long as they 
did not imply political recognition of the PRC.  However, the PRC refused to make this 
separation and continually antagonized trade negotiators who were occasionally forced to 
sign agreements that criticized the Japanese position regarding Taiwan.  In 1970, Zhou 
Enlai announced several principles that discouraged firms operating in South Korea and 
Taiwan to conduct trade with China.  The Sato administration in turn took a hard-line 
approach to the PRC, which was a source of discontent as opinion within Japan favored 
normalization. 
The turning point and substantive beginning of relations between Japan 
and the PRC was Nixon’s announcement of his trip to China in 1971 without any 
consultation with the Japanese.  The Sato administration fell from power and was quickly 
replaced by the Tanaka administration, which openly sought relations with the PRC.                                                   
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Coupled with the broader foreign policy factors discussed preciously, Japan pushed for 
more flexibility in political and economic relations.  Consequently, in 1972, it broke off 
official ties with Taipei, issued a formal apology for damages to China before 1945, and 
declared that it “fully understood and respected” Beijing’s position on Taiwan.  In return, 
China waived reparations, did not require Japan to cease informal relations with Taiwan, 
nor did it try to force a Japanese withdrawal from the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.40 
Within three years, trade between Japan and China tripled to where it 
amounted to one-fourth of China’s trade.  As evidence of Japan’s omni-directional policy 
largely in pursuit of economic relations, Japan still continued its trade with Taiwan.  In 
1978, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Sino-Japanese Long 
Term Trade Agreement further increased trade relations between the two, which were not 
without starts and stops or losses due to political trouble within China.  The timing of 
these agreements immediately preceded the start of Deng Xiaoping’s implementation of 
more open, market-oriented policies.  The expansion of trade continued through the 
1980s before being reduced briefly after the harsh crackdown in Tiananmen Square in 
1989.41  As with most nations in the region, Japan still has to deal with legacies from 
World War Two in its relations with the PRC.  One notable example of this has been 
controversy over textbooks used in Japanese schools that downplayed the aggressive 
actions of Japanese military forces in the 1930s and 1940s.  Japan’s Ministry of 
Education drew harsh criticism in 1982 and 1986 from the PRC and South Korea and this 
issue remains sensitive even in the present.42 
In short, Japanese Cold War relations with the PRC may be explained by 
two major features of overall Japanese Cold War policy.  All throughout the Cold War, 
Japan attempted to promote economic ties, showing the commitment to the expansion of 
economic interdependence throughout Asia and the growth of Japanese overseas markets.  
Politically, Japan was restricted from operating in an official diplomatic capacity until the 
United States openly established relations with the PRC in the 1970s.  It was not until 
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after Japan began its pursuit of an engagement policy independent from that of the United 
States that Japan-PRC relations became official. 
b.  Bilateral Relations with South Korea 
Due to the legacies of Japanese colonial rule over Korea ending in 1945, 
relations between Japan and South Korea have been strained at best.  Despite strong U.S. 
pressures, it was not until the overthrow of Korean President Rhee Syngman in 1960 that 
normalization was able to develop, primarily due to Rhee’s firm anti-Japanese stance.  
His eventual successor Park Chung-Hee looked to Japan as a source of economic growth 
which was necessary for his regime’s legitimacy.43  Consequently, after agreeing to 
reinitiate talks in the early 1960s, the two countries signed the Korea-Japan Basic Treaty 
in 1965, which amongst other things included reparations payments to Korea.  By this 
time, economic relations were also in full swing, as Japan began to contribute a sizable 
percentage of foreign capital investment for successive Korean Five Year Plans starting 
in 1962.44 
Another factor contributing to the early growth of South Korean-Japan 
relations was Japanese Prime Minister Sato’s strong pro-South Korean sentiment.  His 
anti-PRC stance hindered relations with China during this period, but it served to 
strengthen ties between South Korea and Japan.  In line with the Japanese policy of seikei 
bunri, Japan still maintained the trade with North Korea which began as early as 1955.  
However, this trade was not allowed to expand to the level of the trade with South Korea 
and meetings were strictly limited.  Despite a sizable pro-North Korean contingent 
among Koreans living in Japan, the Sato administration was adamantly against 
recognition of the North Korean government.  An understanding that Japan and South 
Korea were part of a necessary framework in the U.S. security picture in Northeast Asia 
made relations easier to develop.  South Korea viewed American bases in Japan, 
particularly on Okinawa as an important deterrence to a North Korean attack.  To 
facilitate these relations, annual ministerial conferences, which were held alternately in 
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Tokyo and Seoul, the Korea-Japan Cooperation Committee, and the Korean-Japanese 
Economic Cooperation Committee were established.45 
However, these relations were no exception to the changing dynamics in 
the 1970s that affected most of Japan’s foreign relations.  Zhou Enlai’s announcement of 
the “principles” that made it difficult for Japanese firms that operated in either Taiwan or 
South Korea to conduct operations in China resulted in many of these firms closing shop 
in South Korea.  The Nixon shocks and the new Tanaka administration’s opening of 
relations with China strained relations with the South Koreans concerned with the 
implications of a China-friendly Japan.  To make matters worse, there were two highly 
contentious issues that made relations especially rocky: the abduction of the Korean 
opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in 1973 and the assassination attempt on Park Chung-
Hee in 1974.  Kim Dae Jung’s abduction occurred when he was in Tokyo and was 
considered a violation of Japanese sovereignty.  Despite initial denials of involvement, 
the Korean government later admitted the role of the KCIA in the incident.  After a brief 
settlement of this issue, there was an assassination attempt on Park Chung-Hee the next 
year which ended up in the death of his wife by a Korean resident of Japan.  The South 
Korean government demanded an official apology from Japan for not stopping the 
incident, but the Japanese government would not assume any responsibility for the 
event.46  Relations would stabilize afterwards, but the relative closeness of the Sato 
administration would not return.  As part of efforts to revitalize ties with the United 
States in the 1980s, Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone made overtures towards South 
Korea.  South Korea’s gradual transition towards democracy also enabled relations to 
strengthen during this period.  As with China, there are colonial legacies of the Second 
World War that markedly set the tone for Japan-South Korea relations, including the 
previously mentioned textbook controversy in the 1980s.47 
Japanese-South Korean relations during the Cold War can be summarized 
by four main stages: initial distance during the Rhee Syngman period, rapprochement 
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during the Park and Sato administrations, strain during the 1970s, and guarded ties 
thereafter. 
4.  Summary of Japanese Cold War Relations 
The conduct of Japanese security policy during the Cold War is a combination of 
their broad notion of comprehensive security and their close involvement with the United 
States.  Initially, Japan strictly followed the political orbit of the United States in their 
diplomatic dealings with other countries, although their policy of Seikei Bunri allowed 
them to deal economically with a wide number of nations.  After the Nixon shocks in the 
1970s, Japan sought to expand its independent role in policy apart from the United States 
and began to engage countries like China.  As the Japanese economy grew and expanded, 
they also invested heavily in the Asian region to create markets and prop up regional 
development, which was later cited as the economic battlefield against communism.  
Towards the end of the Cold War, Japan revitalized its relationship with the United States 
even as it continued its low key pursuit of economic leadership. 
B. JAPANESE POST-COLD WAR RELATIONS 
Japanese post-Cold War Relations have taken a much more active and overtly 
multi-lateral tone than the majority of the Cold War period.  Bilateral relations with the 
United States and other countries were still a major factor, but in the latter stages of the 
Cold War, Japan began to seek positions of international leadership in more than 
economic terms.  After the Cold War ended, the primary threat of Soviet expansion was 
now over and renewed questioning of where the U.S.-Japan security relationship was 
headed.  In the post-Cold War era, the most important security dilemma facing Japan is 
the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula with possible conflict between China and 
Taiwan following behind.  Prime Minister Koizumi’s commitment to close ties with the 
United States, tested and proven after the terrorist attacks against the United States in 
2001, ensure that however independent a role Japan may seek for itself, the United States 
will still remain an important factor in influencing any decision Japan makes in the near 
future. 
1. U.S.-Japan Relations 
The end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat caused many to re-examine the 
nature of the U.S.-Japan security relationship.  What shaped Japan-U.S. relations in the 
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early 1990s was Japan’s response to the First Gulf War.  The response of the Kaifu 
administration was quick to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August of 1990 and 
even entertained the idea of sending minesweepers to the area, although public opinion 
and the interpretation of the legal framework at the time made this option infeasible.  
Japan ended up sending $13 billion in aid to coalition forces, several times their initial 
proposition and banned imports of Iraqi oil.  However, just as important was what they 
did not do: send troops.48  International opinion, especially in the United States, criticized 
Japanese “checkbook diplomacy.”  This caused a shift in Japanese opinion towards a 
more active role internationally, including peacekeeping operations.  But with regards to 
Japan-U.S. relations, it was a disappointing episode for both sides. 
The next major security issue involving both Japan and the United States was 
North Korea’s threatening to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and gain 
nuclear weapons, a theme that still exists today.  Japan was acutely aware of its earlier 
failure during the Gulf War, but was wary about imposing full sanctions against the 
North Koreans, which was an option the United States was pursuing in the UN Security 
Council.  Japan was, and still is, unable to completely enforce a full cutoff of all 
remittances to North Korea from Koreans in Japan, considering the many illegal methods 
of transfer used, and any attempt to do so would bring about massive disorder from the 
pro-Pyongyang residents in Japan.  This incident also highlighted the stringent 
restrictions on the actions of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas, as Japan was 
technically unable to perform many of the tasks requested by the United States should a 
crisis arise.  Part of the fallout of this episode was a call for reviewing the guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan military cooperation.49 
The Clinton administration caused anxiety over the level of U.S. commitment to 
Japanese security given President Clinton’s overt policy of increasing U.S.-PRC 
relations.  In partial recognition of this, President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister 
Hashimoto reaffirmed the security relationship between the two countries and set about a 
reevaluation of the defense guidelines in 1996.  The new U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines 
were completed a year later, reflecting concerns over the post-Cold War situation, to 
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include the impact of the Gulf War, possible nuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and 
China’s rising presence in Asia.50  The new guidelines include cooperation measures such 
as broadened acknowledgement of various normal and peacetime operations to include 
disaster relief, peace keeping operations, humanitarian operations and more information 
sharing.  It also dealt with principles regarding an attack against Japan itself, giving Japan 
primary responsibility to deal with internal matters.  Even more importantly, it dealt with 
events or crises not just in Japan, but also in “surrounding areas,” which broadens the 
definition of the traditional bare minimum for defense capability.51 
The next and current major stage of Japan-U.S. relations is the Global War on 
Terrorism initiated after the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States.  
Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s immediate support for the United States 
demonstrated his commitment to U.S.-Japan relations was more than simply a statement.  
The subsequent Anti-Terrorism Special Measures law passed in 2001 and the 
modification of the International Peace Cooperation Law gave the Japanese Self-Defense 
Forces an expanded role and capability, especially in coordination with the U.S. 52  
Reflecting this, Japan deployed troops to support the U.S. efforts both in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, the latter being even more significant because it is not directly under a UN auspice.  
Troop deployment to Iraq was also important because it seemed to directly make up for 
what they did not do over a decade earlier in the first Gulf War: provide troops on the 
ground. 
The other main issue of U.S.-Japanese cooperation is the six-party talks over the 
North Korean nuclearization issue.  In 1998, a Taepodong missile launch that saw North 
Korea shooting what it claims to have been a satellite fell over 1,000 miles away, flying 
over and past Japan.  Part of the resultant panic and furor elicited by this action was the 
establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) composed of 
the United States, Korea and Japan to deal specifically with the North Korean issue.53  
This still remains as a tool to try and coordinate policy between the three countries,                                                  
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although Japan seems much more interested in maintaining a status-quo.  Any disruption, 
whether a disastrous downturn of events leading to violence or even a peaceful 
unification, is bound to have temporarily negative effects on the regional economy.  More 
cynically, a unified Korea could also provide an economic competitor in the future.  
Japan’s current hard-line stance on the North Korean issue, compounded by the recent 
uproar with media and governmental emphasis on the abduction of Japanese citizens 
during the 1970s and 1980s, falls somewhat in line with Washington.  Tensions resulting 
from North Korea’s recent actions have increased Japan’s willingness to increase its 
security capabilities, including the implementation of a ballistic missile defense system in 
the near future in cooperation with the United States.54 
2. Japanese Multilateral Relations 
Large efforts for a Japanese role within multilateral organizations began during 
the Cold War, but it was not until after the Cold War that Japan began to seek more than 
economic influence.  Vehicles for Japanese multilateral efforts include the United 
Nations, the Asian Pacific Economic Council (APEC), and ASEAN.  The largely 
economic nature of most of these associations points to the lack of solidly effective 
regional cooperation efforts beyond primarily economic terms and the more effective 
economic leverage of Japan. 
a.  United Nations 
Japan’s active pursuit of a role in the UN actually began in the mid-1980s, 
including funding and more Japanese personnel working within the UN.  More relevant 
to security concerns were the Japanese proposals for increased UN involvement in 
peacekeeping operations all around the world.  In 1988 and 1989, Japan became the 
second and third largest contributor to the UN agencies overall and in peacekeeping 
operations, respectively.  In regional terms, they wished to address conflict in Cambodia 
through the United Nations and were part of humanitarian aid efforts to many Indo-
Chinese.55  This reflected early efforts to make Japan more visible in the international 
arena outside of U.S. security policy. 
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The profound shift in Japan’s approach to the United Nations came after 
the First Persian Gulf War and after being criticized for conducting “checkbook 
diplomacy.”  At the time, Japan was aiming for a permanent seat on the Security Council.  
International criticism questioned the validity of Japan’s claim in light of its inability to 
contribute manpower to areas of crisis.  According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs paper, 
“This stinging criticism brought home to their minds the importance of sharing the 
burden with blood, sweat and tears, and not just with money, as a responsible member of 
the international community striving for the common cause of maintaining peace with 
justice.”56  Less poetically, it demonstrated to Japan that if their quest for a permanent 
seat on the Security Council were to be successful, they could not limit themselves solely 
to financial support in the international arena. 
With increased public opinion and policy maker backing, Japan passed 
legal measures making it lawful under strict circumstances for Japanese SDF forces to 
participate in peacekeeping operations overseas.  Starting in 1992, Japan began 
deployments largely under UN auspices around the world in places such as Cambodia, 
Mozambique, Zaire, Tanzania, the Golan Heights, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq.57  
With each successive deployment, restrictions have been eased and capabilities gradually 
expanded, whether in practice, modifications to old laws or the passage of new laws.  To 
ease fears over possible future Japanese militarization, change has been gradual and 
resulted in a relatively positive image of Japan’s more active role internationally. 
b.  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization was founded in 
1989 and is currently composed of 21 member nations.  As its name implies, it is meant 
to promote free trade within the Asia Pacific region.  It has no binding commitments, and 
any commitments are strictly voluntary. 58   Consequently, the effectiveness of this 
organization is rather limited.  It was primarily started to prevent an exclusively Asian 
economic bloc, and the opportunities for Japan to pursue a strong leadership role are 
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rather limited.  Many Asian countries were also dissatisfied with U.S. pressure to open up 
politically sensitive sectors of the regional economy, its redundancy with other 
organizations like the World Trade Organization or the ASEAN Regional Forum, a lack 
of firm structure or narrower specific goals of common interest throughout the entire, 
broad membership.  Disillusionment was furthered during the Asian Financial Crisis in 
1997, which motivated the seeking of other alternatives.59 
c.  Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
In line with its policy of international engagement, Japan increased its 
involvement with ASEAN during the 1990s.  Cooperation with ASEAN was facilitated 
by years of active participation and the perception that Japan could offer alternatives to 
U.S. diplomatic pressures for the region.  Japan expressed serious interest in creating 
more regional security dialogues, proposing the ASEAN-Prime Ministerial Conference 
serve such a purpose.  While this was rejected, Japanese Foreign Minister Nakayama 
revamped a proposal which was also rejected, but later realized in the establishment of 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in the first half of the 1990s.60   
The self-stated objectives of ARF are to “foster constructive dialogue and 
consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern” and “to 
make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence building and preventive 
diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.”61  ARF has a broad membership composed of 24 
nations, including the ASEAN nations, Japan, China, the Koreas, the United States, 
Russia and others.  Part of the Japanese attraction to ARF and ASEAN is the difficulty of 
creating a Northeast Asian cooperation organization, due to past and present tension in 
the area.  ARF has been involved in discussing the nuclear confrontation on the Korean 
peninsula, an item of extreme importance to the Japanese, but it is unlikely to produce 
any concrete results.  However, the dialogue within ARF has proven useful in promoting 
some institutionalization of Asian multilateralism.62 
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Another outgrowth of ASEAN that Japan participates in is the more 
narrowly focused ASEAN + 3, the other two included nations being China and South 
Korea.  ASEAN + 3 was created largely as a result of dissatisfaction with the 
“Washington Consensus” and the performance of the International Monetary Fund during 
the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997.  The crisis also highlighted how linked many Asian 
countries were in terms of economic vulnerability, furthering the need for a more Asia-
centered economic forum.  This reflected concerns stemming from a perception that 
United States involvement via the APEC was neither always necessary nor desired.  As 
with many ASEAN outgrowth organizations, it demonstrates the attractiveness of a 
firmly established Asian multilateral organization to East Asian countries, which they can 
use to discuss their own agendas and possibly establish a regional dialogue of their own.  
While it is primarily an organ for economic cooperation, anything promoting 
interdependence is advantageous in fulfilling the Japanese notion of comprehensive 
security.  Japan hopes to pursue a role of leadership in ASEAN + 3 to promote this, if not 
merely to prevent China from doing so.63 
3. Summary of Japanese Post-Cold War Relations 
From observing Japan’s most important bilateral relationship, the United States, 
and several Japanese ventures in multilateralism, there can be several trends identified in 
Japanese security policies in the post-Cold War period.  The first is, despite the existence 
of doubts about whether the United States can or will provide for the security of Japan, 
the relationship between the two countries remains first and foremost responsible for 
matters of military security.  The second is Japan has undergone a significant shift in 
perspective regarding its role in the international community.  No longer content with 
pursuing silent economic leadership, it is also actively engaged in matters of international 
security.  Using both cooperation with the United Nations and the United States as 
momentum for change, it has expanded the roles and capabilities of the Self Defense 
Forces to meet this new role.  At the same time, any meaningful multilateralism efforts 
on the part of Japan, especially in the Northeast Asian region, usually depend upon 
partnership with either the United States or as outgrowths of already established 
international or regional organizations such as the United Nations or ASEAN.  This 
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points to the difficulty of establishing regional cohesion in Northeast Asia even in 
economic terms, let alone security.  As such, despite Japan’s change in perspective 
towards its international role, any such leadership for the time being will still primarily be 
economic or interdependent with other existing organizations rather than a specifically 
regionally-based Northeast Asian security organization. 
C. TRENDS AND SUMMARY 
The conduct of Japanese security policy after World War II has had several stages 
of development over the years.  The early years saw Japan limited mainly to economic 
recovery and relying very heavily upon the United States for its security.  While such 
reliance has not yet disappeared, Japan’s economic growth led it to pursue a role of 
economic leadership in the development of many Asian countries, primarily those it saw 
as potential markets.  After the Nixon shocks in the 1970s, Japan, as many other Asian 
countries did, started to pursue a foreign security policy of engagement independent of 
but not necessarily counter to American interests in the region.  Japan’s notion of 
comprehensive security is the most significant trait of its security policy, viewing 
national security in terms of economic, political and military terms.  Seeking regional 
interdependence, Japan sought more participation in multilateral organizations as the 
Cold War drew to a close and after, especially following the failure of “checkbook 
diplomacy” in the First Gulf War.  Of particular note is the expansion of the role of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces in tandem with increased participation in United Nations 
peacekeeping operations and U.S.-Japan cooperation efforts.  While Japan seeks a more 
independent role for itself in international relations and regional security, it still preserves 
a close relationship with the United States, as evidenced by heavy support for the Global 
War on Terrorism.  In the future, Japan will most likely continue its increased 
engagement in regional economic and security forums while still maintaining its 
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IV. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE DEBATE  
The security environment in Northeast Asia exacerbated by North Korea’s pursuit 
of nuclear weapons and developing missile programs has highlighted the issue of a 
ballistic missile defense (BMD).  For Japan, participation in a theater missile defense 
(TMD) designed to protect American forces and allies overseas is an option to mitigate 
the destruction and loss of life should hostilities emerge on the peninsula and China’s 
rapidly expanding missile capabilities serve as a reminder of Japan’s vulnerability.  
Background on the North Korean nuclear crisis and current missile capabilities, China’s 
missile capabilities and the evolution of the TMD debate within Japan will be evaluated. 
A. NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS 
North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have been issues of serious concern 
in Japan.  Understanding the development of the security situation on the Korean 
Peninsula adds necessary context to the debate over TMD in Japan.   
In 1989, concern in the newly elected George H. W. Bush administration over 
reports of a possible North Korean nuclear program the intelligence community had been 
tracking for several years began to spread.  North Korea responded with hostility to 
accusations and stated it would not allow inspectors while American nuclear weapons 
remained on the Korean peninsula, which were later withdrawn in conjunction with a 
wider move to remove all ground-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons from 
forward deployed positions world-wide.64  The following dialogue allowed by this action 
resulted in a joint declaration in 1991 entitled the North-South Basic Agreement on 
Reconciliation and Non-aggression.  This stated both Koreas recognized the other, would 
work towards a peaceful relationship and was accompanied by an accord on the nuclear 
issue.  This agreement was important symbolically, if not realistically, and allowed for 
more open exchanges between the two Koreas.65 
What followed were two years of unsuccessful negotiations regarding the issue.  
North Korea confounded IAEA inspectors’ efforts to determine compliance, suspended 
                                                 
64 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas, New York: Basic, 2001, 259-260. 
65 Cha, “Realism, Liberalism, and the Durability of the U.S.-South Korean Alliance,” 616. 
38 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and defied threats to have sanctions imposed.  They were 
declared in non-compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty after withdrawing 8,000 
spent fuel rods from the reactor in Yongbyon and did not allow the IAEA to verify their 
history.  In the meantime, South Korea elected a new president in 1992, Kim Young Sam, 
who did not favor over-engagement with North Korea.  Tensions increased with all 
parties involved, with many fearing the outbreak of a full-scale war.66  A temporary 
resolution was brought about by the 1994 Agreed Framework.  Kim Il Sung agreed to 
“freeze” his nuclear program and allow the weapons inspectors in Yongbyon to stay.  In 
return, the United States would support a plan to build two light water reactors, funded 
and headed primarily by South Korea with United States technology, provide North 
Korea with heavy oil shipments to compensate it for lost energy, and work towards closer 
diplomatic relations with North Korea.67 
Japan was acutely aware of its earlier failure during the Gulf War, but was wary 
about imposing full sanctions against the North Koreans, which was an option the United 
States was pursuing in the UN Security Council.  Complicating the issue was North 
Korea’s successful testing of a Nodong missile into the Sea of Japan, demonstrating their 
ability to strike western areas of Japan.68  Japan was and still is unable to completely 
enforce a full cutoff of all remittances, estimated to be $600 million annually at the time, 
to North Korea from Koreans in Japan considering the many illegal methods of transfer 
used and any attempt to do so would bring about massive disorder from the pro-
Pyongyang residents in Japan.69  This incident also highlighted the stringent restrictions 
on the actions of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces overseas, as Japan was technically 
unable to perform many of the tasks requested by the United States should a crisis arise, 
the list of needed functions nearing almost 2,000 items.  Of particular concern was 
Japan’s inability to rescue its own estimated 9,000 foreign nationals on the Korean 
Peninsula let alone other foreign nationals.  In addition, Japan was unable even to 
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promise the use of hospitals for any soldiers wounded in possible hostilities.  Part of the 
fallout of this episode which highlighted the lack of contingency arrangements between 
the United States and Japan regarding Korea was a call for reviewing the guidelines for 
U.S.-Japan military cooperation under the Nye initiative.70 
The election of Kim Dae Jung to the South Korean presidency reflected a shift in 
opinion by the time he came to office in 1998.  Due to the increased contact between the 
two Koreas and several natural disasters giving South Korea an opportunity to send aid, 
many people saw North Korea as less of a threat and more of a country needing help.  
This attitude towards more engagement and conciliation was embodied in Kim Dae 
Jung’s “Sunshine Policy” which peaked in a summit meeting between Kim Dae Jung and 
Kim Jong Il in June of 2000.  This alignment of policy between the United States under 
Clinton and South Korea under Kim led to a relaxing of some of the tensions which 
developed between the two over their approaches to dealing with North Korea.71   
During this period, North Korea was not without incident, as in 1998, North 
Korea launched a Taepodong missile well over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.  
Pyongyang claimed it was launching a satellite in space to broadcast revolutionary songs 
in honor of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.  Whatever the motivation, it demonstrated to 
the United States, Japan and South Korea that North Korean missile technology was 
advancing at a rapid pace.  This occurred only shortly after intelligence reports revealed 
what could possibly be an underground nuclear weapons complex in violation of the 
1994 Agreed Framework. 72  Japan’s initial response was telling.  Prime Minister Obuchi 
planned on suspending Japanese support for KEDO although United States pressure was 
sufficient in persuading him to resume.  He also made the decision to develop and deploy 
a spy satellite system independent of the United States to monitor developments on the 
Korean Peninsula and the rest of the region.  Japanese public response provided enough 
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momentum to drive more support for the debate over participation in a theater missile 
defense (TMD), demonstrating the impetus crisis situations have on Japanese policy.73   
Part of the United States response was to commission former Secretary of 
Defense William Perry to address the issue.  His first action was to form the Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), composed of the United States, Japan and 
South Korea, in order to form a unified front on the issue.  Perry proposed to the North 
Koreans a vision of full diplomatic and economic relations with the United States 
provided they gave up their missile and nuclear programs.  Recognizing any full-scale 
change would be difficult, he suggested small step-by-step measures by either country, 
which were started by the United States by easing most economic restrictions in return 
for a North Korean moratorium on missile testing.  The underground facility was also 
investigated by the U.S. in return for U.S. energy and monetary concessions.74 
The most recent North Korean nuclear crisis, or realistically, the latest episode of 
the same series, was directly brought about during a visit by the U.S. Assistant Secretary 
of State James Kelly to Pyongyang in October 2002.  The North Koreans openly admitted 
to possessing a uranium enrichment program after accusations it was not upholding its 
end of the bargain formed by various commitments over the years.  This was followed by 
the expulsion of IAEA inspectors from Yongbyon, a declaration it would re-activate the 
facility, and an announced withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 75  
Since then, North Korea has withdrawn from its moratorium on missile testing and the 
Yongbyon facility has started and halted, implying fuel rod extraction for nuclear 
weapons purposes. 
The American response was firm in demanding North Korea give up its nuclear 
program.  As part of its efforts to pressure North Korea to do so, Beijing established a 
multilateral framework entitled the “Six Party Talks”, including the United States, Japan, 
South Korea, China, Russia and North Korea.  Part of Washington’s strategy is to use the 
existing TCOG from the Clinton administration to try and coordinate efforts in these                                                  
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talks.  Despite North Korea’s acceptance of this proposal, the first round of talks in 
August 2003 held in Beijing went nowhere, as the United States refused bilateral 
relations with North Korea or a nonaggression treaty despite South Korean 
encouragement and North Korea refused to give any concessions otherwise.  The United 
States is attempting to push China towards a large role in mediating the crisis and hopes 
the softer approach afforded by its allies South Korea and Japan can also convince North 
Korea to give up its program.76 
Japan’s pursuit of greater capabilities increases as time progresses.  It deployed 
two reconnaissance satellites, increased moves to acquire Patriot missile defense systems, 
deployed naval forces to the Sea of Japan and ratified Emergency Law legislation 
expanding the ability to act during a military contingency.77  Plans were made to have a 
constellation of four satellites to ensure 24-hour surveillance of North Korea, but a rocket 
carrying the latter two was destroyed after engine trouble was detected.78  The second 
and third rounds of Six Party Talks have also proved fruitless as neither Washington nor 
Pyongyang is willing to give ground on their main demands.  In February of 2005, North 
Korea publicly announced it possessed nuclear weapons and ended its moratorium on 
missile testing a month later.79  Amidst repeated statements it is willing to return to the 
Six Party Talks, Pyongyang nevertheless warns it possesses even nuclear weapons to 
deter any United States attack.80 
In July 2005, North Korea announced its willingness to resume talks and the 
fourth round of negotiations begin.  Some attribute this to a willingness on the part of the 
Bush administration to engage in direct talks with North Korea and a change in 
personnel.81  Talks were conducted from 28 July until 7 August when a vote for a recess 
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was passed.  South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon stated his belief that North 
Korea may be willing to give up its nuclear weapons program.  The current United States 
proposal does not allow for North Korea to pursue a nuclear energy program and North 
Korea denies United States claims that North Korea is also pursuing a uranium nuclear 
program in addition to a plutonium program.82  Although talks were planned to resume 
the first week in September, they were delayed until mid-September instead.83  The 
current tension between Pyongyang’s insistence on a right to develop and maintain a 
peaceful nuclear program and Washington’s stance that North Korea has lost this right 
due to flagrant and frequent violations in the past.84  Fundamental disagreement on this 
issue means further talks in the months ahead will prove fruitless in the absence of a 
strong playing card, such as a missile defense undercutting North Korea’s threat 
potential. 
B. NORTH KOREA’S BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES 
Hand-in-hand with the North Korean nuclear development issue is the threat 
posed by North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities.  The exact status of North Korea’s 
missile program is not clear due to lack of information and Pyongyang’s unwillingness to 
open up to the international community.  What follows is a brief description of North 
Korea’s ballistic missile inventory and capabilities. 
1. Hwasong 5, 6/ “Scud B, C” 
It is believed North Korea received its first Scud missiles from Egypt either in the 
latter half of the 1970s or in the early 1980s.  The Scud B is a primitive single-stage, 
Soviet-designed liquid rocket with a range of approximately 300 km and formed the basis 
of North Korean reverse-engineering efforts.  The Hwasong 5 is the domestically 
produced version with a range of 330 km and a payload of approximately 1,000 kg.  The 
Hwasong 6 or “Scud C” missile is the result of an attempt to upgrade the Scud C basic 
design and full-scale production began in the early 1990s.  With a range of 500 km, it 
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features a smaller payload of around 500 to 700 kg with a longer length to facilitate extra 
distance capability.  Together, the various Scud missiles in North Korea are estimated to 
number over 500 and are capable of carrying either a high explosive or chemical 
warhead.  Their range allows coverage of any location in South Korea.  The estimated 
numbers of Scud launch platforms is between 25 and 30.85 
2. Nodong I 
The Nodong missile began as an even further modification of the Scud B missile 
in 1988.  In 1993, it was a Nodong prototype missile tested during the showdown over 
North Korea’s nuclear program.  Despite the missile program being plagued with 
problems, the Nodong missile reached deployment capability sometime in the late 1990s.  
The single stage, liquid-fueled rocket can carry either a high explosive or chemical 
warhead payload of around 1,000 kg for an estimated range of around 1,000 to 1,300 km.  
Despite North Korean claims, it is unlikely they possess the ability to mount a nuclear 
warhead successfully.  However, this still allows Pyongyang to target nearly any of the 
Japanese islands and represents a grave threat to Japanese security.  The Circular Error 
Probability (CEP), or the range to the target the missile will fall 50% of the time is 
between one and four kilometers.  All performance data for the Nodong is derived from 
Pakistani and Iranian missile testing which has connections to North Korea.  The number 
of Nodong I missiles in North Korea’s inventory is estimated to be over 100.86 
3. Nodong B 
The Nodong B is an informal classification for a new missile in development in 
North Korea.  Reports in September 2003 indicated the workings of liquid-fueled rocket 
similar to the Soviet SS-N-6 yet with a range between 2,750 km and 4,000 km.  This 
expanded range could be used to strike American forces on Okinawa or Guam, posing a 
challenge to America’s security umbrella over Japan.  The original SS-N-6 was intended 
to be fired from a submarine, although there is a possibility it could be modified to be 
launched from a small boat.87 
 
                                                 




4.  Taepodong I, II 
Sometimes referred to as Nodong II, The Taepodong I consists of a modified 
Nodong I missile as its first stage, a Hwasong 5 or 6 Scud missile as its second stage and 
an attached warhead.  The missile test flight on 31 August 1998 which landed in the 
ocean after flying over Japan was the first and only test flight of the Taepodong I.  While 
unsuccessful, it is believed it will undergo testing in Iran and Pakistan similar to their 
variants of the Nodong I.  The dual stage Taepodong I has an estimated range of 
approximately 2000 km, gaining an extra 800 km with the addition of another stage.  The 
payload is approximately 1,000 kg and may have the ability to carry nuclear weaponry.  
Continual problems hinder the fielding of this system. 
The Taepodong II is dual or triple stage rocket possibly based on the Taepodong 
I.  With a projected range between 3,750 and 6,000 km, it is North Korea’s attempt at 
developing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM).  It is still deep in development 
with engine tests being the highest possible advancement stage.  Consequently, it is 
unlikely North Korea will develop the necessary missile technology to mount WMD on 
such a missile in the near future, yet it poses a potential danger in being able to reach the 
United States.88 
5.  North Korean Missile Threat Summary 
North Korea’s missile program is still plagued by technological barriers hindering 
its development.  Despite rather primitive guidance systems, it has the ability to devastate 
South Korea and once fully capable, over 100 medium range missiles can strike locations 
in Japan should hostilities arise.  While much attention is focused on North Korea’s 
nuclear efforts, a chemical or high explosive warhead would still cause much damage and 
loss of life if it landed in Japan. 
C. CHINA’S THEATER MISSILE CAPABILITIES 
China’s missile program is far more developed than North Korea’s.  It possesses 
nuclear-tipped ICBM’s capable of reaching targets in the United States.  Beijing’s 
medium and short range missiles capable of reaching Japan are fully developed and 
deployed.  China insists its increase in missile development is aimed at gaining a 
minimum deterrence capability against adversaries equipped with larger arsenals and 
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more advanced technology rather than aggressive arms buildup.89  However, China has a 
history of fully implementing dual-use advances into its military program.  The following 
is a brief summary of China’s theater ballistic missile force. 
1.  DF-11 
The DF-11 is the Chinese version of the basic single stage Scud missile 
employing solid rocket fuel with a range of 300 km.  It is noticeably much more accurate 
with a CEP of 200 meters and can carry either a conventional high explosive warhead or 
up to a 350 kiloton (kt) nuclear warhead.  Plans are currently underway to develop an 
extended range version of this missile with an updated guidance system using global 
positioning systems (GPS) to provide better target data.  As of 1995 there were over 40 of 
these deployed with a target of at least 500 of these Short Range Ballistic Missiles 
(SRBM) produced by 2005.90 
2.  DF-15 
This missile is a more sophisticated SRBM with a range of up to 600 km for a 
nuclear warhead up to 350 kt.  It employs an inertial guidance system with a CEP of 280 
meters with plans to increase accuracy to 30-45 meters.  It enjoys several other 
advantages including integration with an all digital control system enabling a launch time 
of 30 minutes from highly mobile launch vehicles.  The body of the missile provides 
camouflage for the warhead during its downward trajectory by trailing behind it, being 
ten times larger than the warhead.  It forms the mainstay of China’s SRBM’s with an 
estimated 250 deployed in Leping, Nanping and Yangan provinces, all located within 
striking distance of Taiwan.  When China demonstrated its missile capabilities in 1995 
and 1996 with multiple accurate launches, it used DF-15 missiles in its political move to 
dissuade Taiwan from independence.  Upon possible resolution of the Taiwan crisis, the 
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3.  JL-1 
The JL-1 is a dual stage submarine-launched ballistic missile, currently deployed 
on the Xia Type 092 class submarine.  The submarine can carry 12 of these 200-300 kt 
nuclear warheads with a range of 1,700 km and a CEP of 300-400 meters.91  There is 
speculation whether or not the single Xia class submarine is in operation due to the 
limited practicality of this weapon and lack of submarine experience in the Chinese navy.  
The Xia submarine has never traveled outside Chinese regional waters.92   
4.  DF-21 
The DF-21 is land-version of the JL-1 missile with a similar range of 1,800 km, a 
200-300 kt warhead and a CEP of 300-400 meters.  As with other ballistic missile 
systems, plans are underway to increase the accuracy of its guidance system.  Because of 
its extended range the DF-21 is gradually replacing the DF-3 missile.  Despite being a 
shorter range missile, it can still reach many strategic locations in Asia, including Japan 
from its Tonghua base near North Korea.  Currently an estimated 100 are produced with 
around 50 of them being deployed.93 
5.  DF-3 
The DF-3 is a long-range, liquid-fueled missile with a range of 3,000 km.  It can 
carry a single 700-3,000 kt warhead or three smaller 50-100 kt warheads.  It has the 
capability of being silo-launched or being employed from portable launch pads.  It is 
currently being phased out of the Chinese inventory as DF-15 missiles are adequate for 
use against Taiwan, the United States no longer has bases in the Philippines and the more 
advanced DF-21 is filling much of the same role.  There are an estimated 40 of these still 
deployed although DF-3 launchers are being converted for use with the DF-21.94 
6.  DF-4 
The DF-4 is a dual stage rocket based on the DF-3 with an additional added stage.  
It has the ability to launch a 3 megaton nuclear warhead a distance of 4,500 – 6,000 km.  
It requires a two hour fueling period and must either be rolled out or elevated to launch 
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site, usually being stored underneath tall mountains in tunnels.  There are an estimated 20 
DF-4 missiles in the Chinese inventory.95 
7.  Summary of Chinese Theater Missile Capabilities 
Chinese theater missile capabilities currently appear to have a current and short-
term focus upon deterring a Taiwanese declaration of independence and usage if such an 
event were to occur.  According to a recent Congressional Research Service Report, there 
are between 650 and 730 DF-15 and DF-11 missiles deployed directly across Taiwan 
with the numbers increasing yearly.96  However, missiles deployed elsewhere do have the 
capability to easily reach Japan, a fact not lost on the Japanese people themselves.  
Although the United States is currently pursuing a policy of strategic ambiguity with 
regards to Taiwan, any outbreak of hostilities between China and Taiwan would 
conceivably endanger the United States and because of their close relationship, Japan as 
well. 
D. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MISSILE DEFENSE TERMINOLOGY 
Before discussing the TMD debate within Japan, it is necessary to give an 
introduction to basic aspects of TMD and Ground Based Midcourse Defense (GMD, 
previous referred to as NMD in the Clinton Administration) in general.  The U.S. Missile 
Defense Agency (MDA) divides its layered system of missile defense into three target 
areas: boost phase defense, midcourse phase defense and terminal phase defense.  Boost 
phase defense is an upper-tier defense system, meaning it focuses on upper to exo-
atmospheric interception of the missile, usually intended for long-range missiles.   
The boost phase lasts approximately three to five minutes after launch to an 
altitude of around 300 miles.  The main boost phase defense systems are the Airborne 
Laser (ABL) and Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI).  The ABL is a Boeing 747-mounted 
laser designed to focus heat upon the surface of the missile until it explodes and is 
targeted against short, medium or long-range missiles.  The goal of KEI is to use mobile 
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launch missiles to intercept targets with their boost engines still engaged as they fight 
against the atmosphere and later expand the capability to midcourse phase interception.97 
Midcourse phase defense, another upper tier system, occurs after the target 
vehicle’s thrust ceases and it follows a more predictable glide path.  This phase lasts 
about 20 minutes, allowing for easier tracking and interception in theory, but this period 
is where most interception countermeasures such as decoys are deployed.  The two 
midcourse phase defense systems are the GMD and Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 
(previously referred to as Navy Theater Wide or NTW in the Clinton Administration).  
GMD relies upon a comprehensive system of sensors and radars to track a vehicle’s flight 
path and the launch of a kill vehicle to destroy it on impact using hit-to-kill technology 
rather than explosion.  With this system, collision would occur above or just in the 
atmosphere and the debris would burn away upon re-entry.  Six interceptors are currently 
deployed in Ft. Greely, Alaska with plans to add ten more within the year.  The Aegis 
Ballistic Missile Defense employs similar technology except it is launched from Aegis 
cruisers and can engage targets in both ascent and descent stages, reducing the 
opportunities for countermeasures to be activated.  It uses the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) 
currently equipped on Aegis cruisers.98 
Terminal phase defense occurs as the warhead enters the atmosphere on its return 
trajectory to the earth and lasts from around 30 seconds to one minute.  The primary 
defense systems are Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and the PATRIOT 
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3).  THAAD is an upper tier system designed to destroy the 
warhead as it transitions from midcourse to terminal phase and is geared towards short 
and medium range ballistic missiles.  It fires from a mobile, truck-based launch vehicle 
and together with radar and command, control and battle management (C2BM) 
components it can be easily deployed via C-130.  The PAC-3 is the latest generation of 
PATRIOT defense capability and is a lower tier system designed to intercept missiles as 
they descend in the atmosphere.  PAC-3 is the most developed component of the overall 
ballistic missile defense system and fires from a mobile launcher capable of holding 16 
                                                 
97 “BMD Basics,” Missile Defense Agency, <http://www.mda.mil/mdalink/html/basics.html> 
accessed 16 June 2005. 
98 Ibid. 
49 
interceptors at once.  It is also capable of destroying other air threats such as cruise 
missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and aircraft.  According to a recent Congressional 
Research Service Report, the Patriot missile defense system intercepted Iraqi missiles in 
nine out of nine engagements.99  Both systems of terminal phase defense use hit-to-kill 
technology.100 
E. EVOLUTION OF U.S.-JAPAN TMD COOPERATION 
The internal debate regarding the acceptability and feasibility of Japanese 
participation in a TMD system has been slow, punctuated by periods of rapid debate only 
during times of high crisis.  Understanding the debate within the United States is also 
useful as pressure from Washington is a major driver for debate within Japan, hence the 
included discussion about key factors regarding the issue in America.   
Discussions between the United States and Japan regarding missile defense 
originated in the beginning of the 1980s with the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI) by the Reagan administration in 1983.101  In 1989, the United States and Japan 
initiated a joint study, Strategic Defense Initiative Office Western Pacific (SDIO 
WESTPAC), which lasted for four years and recommended Japan adopt THAAD, a 
satellite communications network and explore sea-based ballistic missile defense options.  
It concluded the North Korean Nodong missile was the major future threat in Japan’s 
security, no doubt reinforced by North Korean missile testing during this same period.102  
In 1991, Japan became the first nation to purchase United States Patriot missiles.  
However, there were several problems in the early 1990s hindering cooperation between 
the United States and Japan.  The original proposal of Global Protection Against Limited 
Strikes (GPALS) included space-based elements to destroy missiles, violating Japan’s 
non-weaponization of space laws, a cooperative architecture which caused a conflict with 
Japan’s legal restraints on collective security and allowed the sharing of BMD technology 
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which could possibly violate Japanese constraints on arms exports.  Furthermore, the 
entire issue was framed in an antagonistic way by the United States as a method to obtain 
Japanese technology and funding in order to cut costs, reduce the trade imbalance 
between the two countries, and alleviate “free rider” claims against Japan not 
contributing to its own defense.  Lastly, reducing Japanese options to mainly the purchase 
of finished American products posed a threat to Japanese defense industries.103 
Within the United States, the debate for missile defense was given a boost by 
claims of the effectiveness of Patriot missiles against Scud missiles in Iraq.  Although it 
was later revealed effectiveness was due more to the explosion of patriot missiles in the 
vicinity of Scud missiles which caused them to veer off path, such information was not 
available at the time.104  Despite such impressions, the Democratic Party, the majority 
party, put forth strong opposition on the basis of feasibility and the danger of upsetting 
arms agreements with Russia.  Nor was the George H. W. Bush administration fully 
behind the issue of ballistic missile defense and there was a lack of consolidated support 
which relegated the issue to budget-induced irrelevance. 
The next round of hard debate within the United States regarding ballistic missile 
defense was after the Republican Contract with America in 1994, where ballistic missile 
defense was one part of the overall agenda and promise which made American voters 
give a Republican majority in the Senate and the first Republican majority in the House 
of Representatives in over four decades.  As a result of political maneuvering, much of 
the Republican initiative was stalled and many conservatives balked at the large price tag 
of missile defense.  The 1995 National Intelligence Estimate which stated it would be at 
least 15 years before a credible threat to the United States from ballistic missiles could 
even emerge if pursued.  This was used to effectively stifle very meaningful budget 
allocation towards ballistic missile defense and the debate over its relevance 
foundered.105 
Overseas, Washington and Tokyo repackaged the issue as a matter of alliance 
management and the U.S.-Japan Theater Missile Defense Working Group was 
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established to focus on reconciling needs with constraints.  In 1995, Japan purchased 24 
PAC-2 missiles, the predecessor to PAC-3.  A study concluded by the group in 1998 
recommended the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was the logical path 
of implementation considering the existence of Japanese Aegis cruisers and flexibility of 
the NTW system.  More importantly, it coincided with the Japanese shipbuilding 
industry’s desire to build more Aegis cruisers and would allow domestic defense 
industries time to develop their version of the PAC-3.106  Of no small importance was the 
Chinese test firing of DF-15 missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995 and 1996 in 
increasing the sense of Japanese vulnerability to ballistic missiles.107 
Two events provided the issue of ballistic missile defense more momentum both 
in the United States and in Japan.  The first, and more focused within the United States, 
was the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States 
which was a bipartisan panel of nine members, five Republican and four Democrat, in 
1997.  This panel was composed of the CIA Director George Tenet and chaired by 
Donald Rumsfeld, who later became George W. Bush’s secretary of defense.  Also 
included were Paul Wolfowitz, the future deputy secretary of defense and the staff 
director Steven Cambone who would become the deputy undersecretary for defense 
policy.  Its unanimous key conclusions, published in July 1998, emphasized the growing 
ballistic missile threats from nations such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea along with the 
constant threat from Russia and China and the inability of the intelligence community to 
properly estimate the dangers, capabilities and indications of ballistic missile threats.  
While it did not mention the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate specifically by name, it 
was strongly implied as a direct refutation.108 
The timing of the Rumsfeld Commission Report added greatly to its impact on the 
debate.  Barely a month later, the North Korean testing of a Taepodong missile which 
flew over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean on August 31, 1998, provided the next spur 
for TMD cooperation.  While the Rumsfeld Commission revitalized the debate within the 
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United States, the North Korean launch appeared to validate the need for a ballistic 
missile defense by the Japanese as well.  Public opinion and support shifted towards 
TMD and Japan officially began supporting the United States TMD program.  Despite 
opposition by the Japanese Socialist and Communist Parties and some members 
expressing reservation or opposition in the Komeito and Democratic Parties, the Diet 
allocated funds in the Defense Agency’s budget for BMD cooperation efforts.  This 
opposition centered mainly on constitutional objections, as with other issues regarding 
the expansion of SDF capabilities.  Japan agreed to research sea-based BMD capabilities 
and produce prototypes of various components.  In addition, Japan began spy satellite 
production, later launching two successfully yet losing two in November 2003 due to 
launch errors.109  The error was traced to a solid booster rocket failing to separate from 
the satellites after burning out due to equipment failure resulting from the booster nozzle 
which had burned through.110  
While perceptions of the North Korean missile threat certainly provide strong 
impetus for support of TMD in Japan, strong Washington backing of the program should 
not be downplayed.  George W. Bush’s election campaign in 2000 included the plank of 
BMD as an essential national defense issue.  His election saw key members of the above-
mentioned Rumsfeld Commission enter positions of key leadership, including Secretary 
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, and Deputy 
Undersecretary for Defense Policy Steven Cambone.  Their appointments were far from 
arbitrary and combined with a solidifying Republican majority suggest continued backing 
for BMD for the foreseeable future.  One of the most significant changes in approach 
taken by the Bush administration was the elimination of the distinction between national 
missile defense and theater missile defense.  This was undertaken on the realization that a 
theater missile defense with respect to a system designed to protect United States troops 
abroad could very well constitute a national missile defense for the host nation.  While 
seemingly a semantic difference, it also means a theater missile defense could be part of a 
system protecting the United States, which brings up collective defense issues which 
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raise warning flags in the Japanese debate over missile defense. 111   Congressional 
approval of spending for missile defense supports this as $7.6 billion was approved for 
fiscal year 2003, $9.1 billion for fiscal year 2004, $9.95 billion for fiscal year 2005 and 
the House has recently approved a bill for $8.58 billion for fiscal year 2006.  In all cases, 
the amount of approved money has closely matched the amount requested for 
appropriation.112  Firm backing from Washington of BMD resulted in steady pressure for 
Tokyo to adopt a similar stance regarding TMD. 
However, the primary factor prompting more support for TMD in Japan still 
remains the recent North Korean nuclear crisis and missile threat.  Following the 
Taepodong missile launch in 1998, cooperation between Japan and the United States over 
missile defense became more palatable.  Less than a month later, Tokyo formally 
announced the decision to accept the United States proposal for a TMD system on 20 
September 1998, specifically citing the North Korea launch as a primary rationale.  
About a year later on 16 August 1999, Japan and the United States government signed a 
memorandum of understanding stating a five-year joint research and development 
program for missile defense would commence with Japan spending around $300 
million.113  
In recent years, there has been a shift from pure research and development to 
more concrete agreements.  Aiding this is the fact TMD has not proven to be an 
exception to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s strong support for the United States in 
many policy areas.  This creates a harmonization between Washington and Tokyo 
regarding several contentious aspects of missile defense.  In late December 2003, Tokyo 
declared it would start to actually implement a missile defense system, with the spread of 
missile and weapons of mass destruction proliferation as a key factor for the decision.114  
Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo was clear in stating any missile defense would be 
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used solely for the defense of Japan, not be a threat to neighboring countries, and not for 
the defense of any third country.115  Japan has since agreed to deploy SM-3 missiles on 
its Kongo class Aegis cruisers in 2007 and to continue its research cooperation with the 
United States. 116   In November 2004, Washington agreed to give Japan license to 
domestically produce PAC-3 interceptors as part of Japanese TMD efforts.117  In the 
meantime, Japan is expected to continue purchasing PAC-3 interceptors from the United 
States, which began early in 2005 with the sale of 16 interceptors by Lockheed-Martin.118  
Further evidence of Japan’s commitment, National Defense Program Guidelines in 
December 2004 made specific mention for the first time of China and North Korea being 
the primary threats to Japanese security.  In addition, it directly stated Japan’s 
commitment not only to aid BMD research defense but also the purchase and 
development of BMD as part of its overall strategy to combat the threat of ballistic 
missiles, something repeatedly mentioned throughout the entire document. 119   In 
February 2005, a meeting between United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs 
Machimura Nobutaka and Minister of State for Defense and Director-General of the 
Defense Agency Ohno Yoshinori resulted in the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative 
Committee Joint Statement.  Amongst other things, it re-affirmed the mutual benefit and 
continued support for cooperative missile defense efforts between the two countries.120 
F.  CURRENT INTERNAL DEBATE ON TMD IN JAPAN 
Studying domestic debate within Japan regarding missile defense requires an 
understanding of key domestic players and the issues of contention.  While dated, 
Swaine, Swanger and Kawakami’s “Japan and Missile Defense” offers a useful 
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framework of analysis which includes eight key domestic players and six key issues on 
which they interact, to which the author adds a seventh, the North Korea factor.   
 
Table 1. Key Domestic Players and Issues for Japanese Missile Defense121 
Key Domestic Players Key Issues 
• The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
• The JDA and the Self-Defense Forces 
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• The Ministry of Finance 
• The Diet 
• The Political Parties 
• The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry and Private Business 
• The Public and the Media. 
• Alliance Maintenance 
• Financial Constraints 
• Legal Considerations 
• Technical Feasibility and Architecture 
issues 
• Industrial/Commercial Considerations 
• The China Factor 
• The North Korea Factor 
 
1.  The Prime Minister and the Cabinet 
As the arbiters of executive responsibility within the Japanese political system, 
the prime minister along with his cabinet are in the position of wielding extensive 
influence over the Japanese debate regarding missile defense.  The consensus nature of 
Japanese politics makes it impossible for the prime minister to solely direct policy on any 
issue let alone missile defense, but skillful political maneuvering can result in a 
considerable amount of agenda setting and a measure of control over policy direction.  
Furthermore, government interpretation of the various legal considerations such as 
collective defense, arms sales, and what constitutes “defensive defense” are important 
facets determining the implementation of a missile defense by Japan.  One tool at the 
disposal of the prime minister has always been the pursuit of close relations with the 
United States.  Reflecting a general move towards alliance management with the United 
States and the overall repackaging of missile defense as an alliance issue, Japanese Prime 
Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro began the trend of securing funding for cooperative missile 
defense efforts in the mid-1990s which was continued by his successor, former Foreign 
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Minister Obuchi Keizo when he assumed office in 1998.  During his term the 
memorandum of understanding between Japan and the United States was signed wherein 
both countries agreed on a role for Japan in the research and development of a missile 
defense system.   His efforts in promoting missile defense were more of a delegation to 
his Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu who was instrumental in capitalizing on the 
North Korean Taepodong missile launch. 122  Prime Minister Obuchi suffered a stroke in 
April 2000 and was replaced by Mori Yoshiro who resigned just a year later.  He was 
replaced by current LDP Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro in April 2001, being elected 
the most populist prime minister in Japanese history and on the promises of reform. 
Before Koizumi’s prime ministership, the direction from Japan’s executive was a 
steady move towards joint research and development with the United States without any 
clear, established vision towards the long term.  Furthermore, there was more emphasis 
given on Japan’s research role rather than a commitment to actual implementation and 
adoption by Japanese forces.  The entire issue of missile defense represents not only an 
opportunity for a prime minister to demonstrate his support for the United States, but also 
a pitfall which could cause instability.123  As such, most prime ministers in the past have 
chosen to approach the issue very cautiously. 
Prime Minister Koizumi has demonstrated a willingness to strongly support the 
actions and policies of the United States regardless of specific levels of popularity of his 
decisions.  Most notable is his decision to send SDF forces to contribute to the 
stabilization of Iraq, an action unpopular with the majority of the Japanese people.  
Regarding North Korea, he has adopted a hard line stance compatible with Washington’s 
view as well as large segments of the Japanese population, although this is in conflict 
with Seoul’s wishes for a more accommodating approach.  Capitalizing on anxiety over 
North Korea’s actions, he has continually pushed not only for joint research of missile 
defense but development as well.  He recognized early the legal considerations of missile 
defense and considers reinterpreting or amending the Constitution a viable option.  This 
is part of an overall strategy to better enable cooperation between the SDF and the United 
                                                 
122 Ibid., 42-44. 
123 Ibid., 42-43. 
57 
States military on a wide range of security issues, which many see as Japan’s quickening 
approach to normalization. 
Part of Koizumi’s ability to implement large changes in direction from a Japanese 
political standpoint is his popularity with the Japanese people.  As long as Koizumi 
maintains popular support overall he will be able to continually back missile defense as 
part of pursuing close ties with the United States.  This popularity was put to the test 
during the lower house elections on September 11, 2005.  Koizumi’s pursuit of postal 
reform has always been part of his reform agenda in politics and he dissolved the lower 
house of the Japanese national Diet on August 8, 2005 after the upper house failed to pass 
a postal reform bill which only narrowly passed the more powerful lower house.  37 LDP 
members stood opposed to postal reform.   Koizumi stated those still opposed to the bill 
would not be allowed to run with LDP support during the elections, which he maintains 
are a way for the Japanese people to voice their opinion in Japanese politics.  If the LDP 
and New Komeito coalition fails to win a majority, Koizumi says he will step down as 
prime minister. 124   Interestingly enough, DPJ opposition leader Okada Katsuya 
announced he would resign if the DPJ did not win the majority, raising the stakes for the 
election.125  Koizumi’s move was seen as a way to exert pressure on the upper house, 
which is less powerful than the lower house but can not be dissolved by the prime 
minister.  The postal service, with $3 trillion in assets, is a large support base for the LDP 
and hence Koizumi’s difficulty in persuading all LDP members to follow his lead.  One 
of Koizumi’s main motivations for privatization is the large amounts of new money 
circulated in the private sector with a potential to revitalize much of the economy.  
According to polls conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun, the Yomiuri Shimbun, the Asahi 
Shimbun, and the Nihon Keizai, Koizumi’s popularity and support for the LDP among the 
Japanese people rose since his call for a snap election.126  These numbers were accurately 
reflected during the election, which resulted in a land-slide victory for the LDP.  The 
LDP increased its number of seats to 296, up from 212 and well within the majority of                                                  
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the 480 seat chamber.  The New Komeito Party, the LDP’s ruling coalition partner, lost 
three seats for a total of 31.  This mandate from the people is a clear sign the Japanese 
population is willing to maintain support for Koizumi because of his promises of reform, 
despite the unpopularity of SDF deployment to Iraq.  Consequently, strong support for 
missile defense will continue from the office of the prime minister and his cabinet. 
2.  The JDA and the Self-Defense Forces 
Japan’s emphasis on civilian control of the military has relegated the status of 
defense affairs to an agency, rather than a ministry, level position.  However, the direct 
military nature of this security issue leads the JDA to be highly involved in the debate 
over missile defense.  For the JDA, three prevalent attitudes exist: those concerned about 
the budget, those concerned about research and development, and those concerned about 
maintaining a close security relationship with the United States.  The latter two see 
missile defense as an avenue for advancing their interests while the former sees the high 
cost as a danger to other defense programs.  On the whole, there has been a shift towards 
growing advocacy by the JDA in light of the North Korean and Chinese missile threat 
and the recasting of missile defense as an alliance maintenance issue.127 
a.  Japanese Ground Self Defense Force 
 The Japanese Ground Self Defense Force (JGSDF) initially stood to gain 
the least from joint missile defense efforts as little operational control of key components 
would be under JGSDF control yet they would have to bear some of its cost.  However, 
the JGSDF does have a large component of more strategy-focused members who view 
the importance of overall Japanese security as an integral part of decision making.  
Furthermore, missile defense efforts offer an opportunity to upgrade existing command, 
control, communications, computers and intelligence (C4I) and the chance to replace 
outdated Hawk air defense batteries with spin-off technology.128  Perhaps the Midterm 
Defense Program for fiscal years 2005-2009 earmarking the acquisition of eight medium-
range surface-to-air missile batteries for the JGSDF and the dropping of a proposal to 
reduce the size of the JGSDF to 120,000 members (authorized troop strength is 161,000 
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by 2009 in the Midterm Defense Program although troop size is targeted at around 
149,000) reflects some of these concerns.129 
b.  Japanese Air Self Defense Force 
The Japanese Air Self Defense Force (JASDF) stands to gain from missile 
defense cooperation as it retains operational control over its missile defense systems.  
Furthermore, the JASDF has much to gain from a modernized C4I infrastructure in 
conjunction with a missile defense system.  Opposition, while not in the majority, would 
come from those concerned over budget cuts for other programs such as a new-
generation fighter.130  The Midterm Defense Program allocates the upgrading of patriot 
missile capabilities while still allowing for modernization and acquisition of new fighters.  
It also states the desire to modernize the Base Air Defense Ground Environment 
(BADGE) to aid detection and tracking of ballistic missiles.131 
c.  Japanese Marine Self Defense Force 
The branch of service with the most to gain is the Japanese Marine Self 
Defense Force (JMSDF).  While the United States scrapped the Clinton administration’s 
Navy Theater Wide program, incorporating elements of it into mid-course and boost 
phase intercept programs, it offers justification for the acquisition of Kongo-class AEGIS 
destroyers, emphasis on naval spending, and improvements in personnel training and 
C4I.132  Consequently, the JMSDF is the most vocal advocate of missile defense in the 
JDA.  The Midterm Defense Program reflects this advocacy and announces a large focus 
on technical research behind sea-based upper tier engagement of ballistic missiles and an 
improvement of AEGIS destroyers.133 
On balance, there has been a decided shift towards support of missile defense in 
the face of North Korean and Chinese missile threats.  While there are concerns about the 
costs of such efforts, it is seen as an effective way to increase the security relationship 
with the United States, modernize C4I components of the JSDF and promote joint 
operations as well as operations with the United States, and enhance the national defense 
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image of the JSDF by providing a concrete defense against what much of the Japanese 
public feels is the largest security threat facing Japan.  This concerted drive for missile 
defense places it at odds with the Ministry of Finance, as no service is willing to just 
accept cuts in order to accommodate increased defense spending on missile defense. 
3.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has an active interest in the missile 
defense debate as it has large strategic impact on Japan’s relationship with the United 
States, China, North Korea, South Korea and Russia.  In the earlier days, the views of 
“China hands” in the ministry were a heavy influence and MOFA often cautioned against 
missile defense cooperation as it would antagonize Beijing.  After growing politicization 
of Sino-Japanese relations, the North Korean Taepodong launch in 1998, the dwindling in 
number of pro-China members of the LDP and increased nationalism among younger 
generations of Japanese politicians, MOFA changed directions.134  Some officials state 
MOFA support for missile defense already existed before the Taepodong launch, but it 
provided a convenient opportunity to publicly state their position.135  While certainly still 
cognizant of the negative impact the pursuit of missile defense cooperation has on Sino-
Japanese relations, efforts have focused on convincing China that any Japanese missile 
defense system is solely defensive, will not be used to defend other countries, and is not a 
threat to China.  In addition, MOFA tends to emphasize the close relationship the effort 
garners with the United States regardless of the actual effectiveness of the system.  In a 
speech commemorating the sixtieth year after the end of World War II and US-Japan 
relations in April 2005, Foreign Affairs Minister Machimura Nobutaka made specific 
mention of the North Korean missile threat, Japan’s continued dedication to 
implementing (not just researching) missile defense and the importance of the security 
relationship between Japan and the United States.136 
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4.  The Ministry of Finance 
Predictably, the Ministry of Finance is more concerned with the budgetary aspect 
of missile defense rather than its military or political implications.  The amount of 
opposition to missile defense from the Ministry of Finance is proportional to the degree 
increased spending on missile defense hampers its efforts to cut spending overall.  In the 
face of strong backing for missile defense from many quarters, the Ministry of Finance is 
now concerned with minimizing costs while maintaining cautious approval of the 
program.  Because missile defense represents a large increase in cost for the JDA, most 
of the tension is not over whether to allow missile defense in the budget, but in a struggle 
against the services, especially the JGSDF, to force cuts in other areas to make room for 
missile defense.  Over the past three years, the Ministry of Finance has placed a one 
percent decrease in the national defense budget even as the budget for missile defense has 
increased.  Therefore the emphasis has been on support for missile defense, enhanced 
intelligence and logistics while slimming down the force size and favoring quality over 
quantity.137  The release of the National Defense Program Outline reflected the struggle 
between the Ministry of Finance and the JDA as the Ministry of Finance sought to 
continue its one percent reductions in the defense budget for the next five years.  In 
addition to cutting the number of JGSDF troops, the number of tanks was reduced from 
900 to 600, escort ships from 50 to 47, and fighter planes from 300 to 260.  This was all 
to accommodate the ten billion dollar cost of missile defense over the next ten years.138  
As long as Japan shows no definitive signs of permanent economic recovery, it is 
expected the Ministry of Finance will extract a hard bargain from the JDA in return for 
approving missile defense. 
5.  The Diet 
The Diet has two major leverage points on the ballistic missile debate.  The first is 
the authority to approve the budget which would include funding for missile defense.  
Debate over funding offers a venue for opposition based on, or reinterpretations of, 
various legal considerations surrounding missile defense.  The second regards its 
interpretation of the traditional stance based on a 1967 Diet resolution declaring Japan’s 
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peaceful use of space.  Some analysts view the broadening debate within the Diet as a 
mere stating of political positions rather than having serious implications for the actual 
direction of policy.  Therefore much of the meaningful debate will occur within political 
parties who will take an overall stance in the Diet.139   
Recent action by the Diet has confirmed this view, with the past several years 
seeing the Diet following the lead of Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro on a wide variety 
of issues related to cooperation with the United States and other security matters.  These 
include the enactment of various emergency legislation, special measures, and laws 
which increase the capability of the SDF to act independently or in conjunction with the 
United States in defense contingencies.  Increasing perception of a North Korean threat 
has created the environment for actions such as solid Diet support for the deployment of 
reconnaissance satellites to monitor developments on the Korean peninsula, blurring the 
principle of “peaceful use of space” by allowing defense related usage of space.  This 
perception has also served as a prime mover allowing the Koizumi cabinet to push 
through support of missile defense efforts with Diet approval for funding.  While it is by 
no means unanimous support, the combination of strong executive backing, the prospects 
for close security ties with the United States, and the North Korean threat makes it 
difficult to overcome the push for missile defense. 
The September 11, 2005 lower house elections resulted in a landslide victory for 
the pro-missile defense LDP.  All 480 seats were up for election, with 212 seats held by 
the LDP, not counting the 37 held by those opposed to postal reform which ran 
independently or in new parties.  The coalition partner New Komeito Party had 34 seats 
for a combined 246 seats, five more than the 241 required for a majority.  The DPJ had 
175 defending seats.140  The gaining of 84 seats by the LDP, the DPJ loss of 64 seats, and 
New Komeito’s loss of 3 seats means the LDP is a majority party with 296 seats even 
without the New Komeito coalition.141   
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6.  Political Parties 
The Japanese political scene consists of five main political parties, the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP), the New Komeito, The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), The 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).  Their stances 
towards missile defense drive much of the Diet debate, which is mainly the stating of 
those political stances. 
a.  Liberal Democratic Party 
The ruling LDP has demonstrated support for missile defense and 
Koizumi’s security policies with regards to cooperation with the United States.  This is in 
line with the LDP’s very conservative stance and desire for a strong relationship with the 
United States.  The LDP has been responsive to the North Korean missile threat and will 
follow the lead of any prime minister who pushes missile defense for the foreseeable 
future.  Enjoying majority rule for most of post-World War II Japanese history, it still 
holds broad public support despite recent gains of the opposition Democratic Party of 
Japan.  Having gained a majority in the lower house of the Diet even without the New 
Komeito Party, the LDP now has 296 seats, well above the 241 required for a Majority.  
While it still needs the New Komeito party for a majority in the upper house, the LDP has 
more bargaining power with the New Komeito, which has been seen as a moderating 
force on LDP policies. 
b. New Komeito 
The New Komeito, or New Clean Government Party, is the junior member 
of the ruling coalition with the LDP.  It tends to be a conservative reform party with a 
peaceful view towards international politics due to its Buddhist affiliations.  Though New 
Komeito throws its support behind the LDP for missile defense, it has acted as a 
moderator for much of the LDP’s attempts to gain military acquisitions and to stretch the 
allowable legal framework for security cooperation between the United States and Japan.  
In recent years, the LDP relied more upon the New Komeito as the DPJ gained more 
support in urban electoral areas.142  Despite earlier claims, New Komeito head Kanzaki 
Takenori backed the LDP during the September 11th election due to the LDP’s emphasis 
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on reform embodied by postal privatization, during which it lost 3 seats.143  There may be 
a declining level of influence by the New Komeito with the LDP, but both parties 
renewed their coalition as the LDP still needs the New Komeito to hold a majority in the 
upper house.144 
c.  Democratic Party of Japan 
The DPJ is the main opposition party to the LDP and headed by Okada 
Katsuya.  The DPJ holds that the security relationship between Japan and the United 
States is important, but Japan should not allow itself to be dragged into programs or 
engagements solely for the sake of alliance maintenance.  With regards to missile 
defense, it has yet to find a definitive consensus on where it stands.  Under Kan Naoto, 
who resigned last year, the DPJ listed in its manifesto a firm support for missile defense 
and its development.  In a vision statement released last May, Okada said a DPJ 
government would “pursue the missile defense option after it verifies its technical 
feasibility.”145  While not a firm commitment, it is not a denouncement, either.  .  It 
opposes the SDF deployment in Iraq although it moderated recent statements in 
recognition that if the DPJ did gain a majority, it would stand to gain from cordial 
relations with the United States.  With 175 seats going into the September 11th election, 
this could have been a possibility had the trend of Koizumi’s increasing popularity 
reversed itself.  However, the polls surged strongly in favor of postal reform and the DPJ 
lost 64 seats, reducing their presence in the lower house to 113 seats. 
d.  Japanese Communist Party and Social Democratic Party 
The JCP is the next major opposition party although it only has nine 
members in the lower house of the Diet.  The SDP follows behind with only five 
members in the lower house, having lost a seat in the recent election.  Both of these 
parties are strongly opposed to missile defense on the basis of pacifism, opposition to any 
military force including the SDF, or the belief that Japan does not face a missile threat.  
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There are some who state they would support a “leak-proof” missile defense which 
would work against any and all threats, thus ridding the need for any other SDF forces, 
but this is represents an impossibility.  The influence and voter support of both these 
groups has been steadily declining especially in the face of North Korean missile 
tensions.146 
7.  The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and Private 
Businesses 
METI is a supporter of missile defense if it believes there can be net benefits 
gained by Japanese industry.  Defense industry players such as Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries (the main missile defense contractor), Kawasaki Heavy Industries, 
Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, Fujitsu, Toshiba and Nissan Motors stand to gain 
from cooperation with the United States.147  In addition, Japan’s space industry gains 
from more attention given to reconnaissance satellites and spin-off technology from 
missile defense may give it an edge in increasing its poor competitiveness with regards to 
commercial payload launch service.148  So far, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries seems to 
enjoy the biggest gains from missile defense cooperation, being granted over $1 billion in 
PAC-3 contracts and a license for indigenous PAC-3 production.149  The pattern of 
Japanese purchasing of U.S. systems until they develop the capability to produce their 
own versions is one continued in SM-3 cooperation as well. 
8.  The Public and the Media 
The Japanese public has increased awareness of ballistic missile defense, due 
largely in part to the Taepodong missile launch in 1998 and the media’s interest in 
covering the various North Korean issues along with missile defense since then.  The 
Yomiuri Shimbun, the Sankei Shimbun, and the Nihon Keizai Shimbun are traditional 
supporters of Japanese military programs including missile defense.  The Yomiuri 
Shimbun is the largest daily newspaper in circulation.  These three newspapers emphasize 
the security a missile defense grants to Japan.  The Asahi Shimbun tends to take a more 
liberal stance in opposition to the government in general, especially missile defense.                                                   
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Therefore the Asahi Shimbun tends to emphasize the negative impact missile defense 
could have on Japan’s relations with its neighbors. 150   There has yet to be a 
comprehensive public debate on missile defense, although public opinion seems to be 
divided between those concerned about Chinese and North Korean missile threats on one 
hand and those concerned about worsening relations due to a Japanese missile defense on 
the other. 
9. Alliance Maintenance 
Before Koizumi’s concerted efforts to embrace cooperation with the United States 
on missile defense, it was seen as an issue that could either raise tensions or bring closer 
ties.  Over the past several years, missile defense has become another facet of Koizumi’s 
foreign policy representing the very close relationship between the two countries.  For at 
least the duration of the Bush administration, missile defense appears to be an item to be 
utilized as alliance maintenance.  Even had the DPJ gained a majority coalition, the 
notion of alliance maintenance would have allowed the DPJ more flexibility in its policy 
regarding possible opposition if it decided to pursue missile defense.  Due to strong LDP 
success, Koizumi will have the continued opportunity to closely cooperate with the 
United States on missile defense, which has the added benefit of giving Japan leverage in 
American base realignment, especially in Okinawa as Japan is seen as doing “its fair 
share.”  The Japanese fear of being too dependent on United States intelligence relating 
to missile threats is reflected in the launching of reconnaissance satellites to provide their 
own intelligence on North Korea and the region.  A source of tension that still needs to be 
resolved is the nature of collective defense and the possibility of a Japanese system being 
employed to defend areas other than Japan.  This will be discussed more under Legal 
Considerations below. 
10.  Financial Constraints 
The debate over cost consideration is significant as Japan still has yet to recover 
from its economic decline.  The main issues are its overall affordability, its impact on 
other military programs, and its effect on individual armed service budgets.151  The large 
price tag associated with missile defense has become more acceptable to the Diet and 
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Ministry of Finance after growing North Korean missile capabilities and nuclear weapons 
aspirations.  The JDA is an advocate of missile defense, but begrudges the Ministry of 
Finance the heavy cuts it has had to undergo in other areas in order to attain funding for 
it, which is estimated to be around $10 billion to reach full implementation.  These cuts 
are in addition to continual year-after-year one percent cuts in the defense budget by the 
Ministry of Finance.152  In attempts to ease fears of costly dependence on United States 
systems, a compromise was reached where initial procurements would be bought from 
the United States until domestic capability for production is reached.  As to be expected, 
those in favor of missile defense focus on its need while those opposed focus on its cost.   
11.  Legal Considerations 
Four main legal considerations impact the early debate on missile defense after 
the decision was made to participate in joint research, namely a constitutional limitation 
against collective self-defense, a legislative resolution prohibiting the military use of 
space, laws prohibiting the export of weapons and military technology, and the provisions 
of the ABM Treaty.153   
The first consideration represents the issue which needs the most resolution.  
Article 9 of the Constitution has been interpreted to prohibit collective defense on the part 
of Japan.  The integrative nature of a joint missile defense with the United States raises 
the question of whether or not Japan would use resources under its control to shoot down 
ballistic missiles targeted at other countries.  So far, the answer has been a firm “no”, 
such as Koizumi’s statement on 18 March 2005 that “The purpose of our country’s 
missile defense is to intercept incoming missiles targeting Japan.  We are not thinking of 
dealing with other missiles targeting our allies.”154  A recent amendment to the SDF Law 
allows the Director General of the JDA the authority to shoot down any missile over 
Japanese airspace before or after a launch has been detected, although this would later 
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have to be reported to the Diet.155  Opponents of missile defense cite the inevitability of 
Japan violating its Constitution should the system be fully implemented, often pointing to 
a possible confrontation between the United States and China over Taiwan.  Advocates 
either maintain Japan’s ability to stay within legal limits or push for change in the legal 
framework itself.  The trend of an increase in the defense roles and capabilities of the 
SDF over the past fifteen years due to re-interpretation of the Constitution and the 
passing of new legislation suggest this legal consideration as well as others will be 
resolved on the basis of “reality and necessity”.  According to a Mainichi poll of all 
candidates in the recent elections, 80% of all members of the lower house now support a 
revision of the Constitution.  92% of the LDP, 87% of the New Komeito and 69% of the 
DPJ all felt the Constitution should be amended while the JCP and the SDP members 
remained opposed.  Furthermore, 75% of the LDP lower house members felt Japan 
should be able to participate in collective security while 50% of the DPJ and 94% of the 
New Komeito were opposed.156  This means at least 58% of newly elected lower house 
members are now in favor of Japan participating in collective security.  
The second issue is a 1969 resolution adopted by the Japanese Diet at the 
establishment of the National Space Development Agency which limited the use of space 
to “peaceful purposes”.157  While not a law, it has been interpreted to prohibit military 
use of space.  While there has not been a formal abrogation of this resolution, the 
unanimous decision to build reconnaissance satellites following the 1998 North Korean 
Taepodong launch began a process where this legal consideration started to be pushed to 
the side.  In 1999, the Navy Theater Wide program was determined not to be in violation 
of the peaceful use of space, setting the precedent for further action in similar area, even 
though the specific program itself was cancelled by the United States.158  The actual 
deployment of satellites and continual efforts to do so combined with agreements to 
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participate in a missile defense system employing early warning satellites implies this 
legal consideration is largely taking a backseat to necessity. 
Japan’s Three Principles on Arms Exports adopted in 1967 states any export of 
arms from Japan would require METI approval and is not allowed to “communist 
countries, those under UN Security Council embargo, and those involved in or likely to 
be involved in international conflicts.”159  It has been interpreted to mean no sale of 
weapons, weapons parts, or underlying technology.  A joint research venture between 
Japan and the United States on missile defense is founded on the basis of technology 
transfer so a re-interpretation would have to be made.  Along with the release of the 
National Defense Program Outline in December 2004, Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda 
Hiroyuki announced the joint missile defense cooperation would be exempt from the 
three principles only with the United States.160  While very specific in its language, it 
nonetheless represents another instance where the law has been stretched to fit the 
circumstances. 
The last major legal issue, the ABM Treaty, became a moot point after the Bush 
administration announced its intent to withdraw on 14 December 2001, formally 
withdrawing on 13 June 2002 in accordance with the six month window timeframe.161  
The Russian response was surprisingly mild, with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
saying it was a “mistake” but did not threaten the Russian Federation and cooperation on 
a variety of strategic issues would continue.162 
In summary, the main legal consideration still remaining is the notion of 
collective defense.  As a Constitutional issue touching more than just missile defense, 
concrete debate can result in the amending of the Constitution, further reinterpretation or 
less likely, the prohibition of missile defense.  Recent trends have shown the amendment                                                  
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of the Constitution is the most likely outcome.  Legal considerations have served more to 
voice debate and state positions on the issue as they have largely been worked around in 
order to implement missile defense cooperation with the United States. 
12.  Technical feasibility and Architecture Issues 
The skepticism over the feasibility of missile defense represents one of the larger 
obstacles for advocates.  Even among those who recognize the existence of a ballistic 
missile threat from North Korea or China, there are some who view missile defense 
systems as a waste of resources and a problem which would be better addressed through 
diplomatic means.163  The success of Patriot air defenses in Operation Iraqi Freedom has 
been enough to convince some, as evidenced by former DPJ president Kan Naoto’s 
strong support for missile defense, although he was formerly a fierce opponent, after 
witnessing their use in Iraq.  The clearing of this opposition led to easier clearing of 
missile defense proposals in the Diet.164  His successor Okada Katsuya is not as strongly 
convinced, as evinced by the current vague stance held by the DPJ.  Those in favor of 
missile defense tend to stress its need while those opposed stress its technical futility. 
13.  Industrial/Commercial Considerations 
Those in favor of missile defense see an opportunity for synergy between METI, 
the JDA and defense industries which will result in a strengthening of Japan’s defense 
industries, improving technology and acquisition, and the provision of benefits to the 
commercial sector.  Those opposed cite high up-front costs necessary for investment, 
legal barriers, net technology drain and a diversion of funding from current contracts.165  
The legal barrier regarding arms export has been overcome due to the exception provided 
for missile defense with the United States and the problem of net technology drain has 
been addressed by allowing Japanese companies a significant role in the research, 
development and production of missile defense technology.  JDA Director-General Ohno 
Yoshinori has stated “Licensed production would secure Japan's technological and 
production bases. The cost will be higher in the short-term, but when we think about the 
costs of inviting technicians from the United States for maintenance and repair, it would 
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balance out in the long run” and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries licensed production of 
PAC-3 missiles would be beneficial.166  Despite initial hesitance, it appears the defense 
industry is generally in favor of missile defense. 
14.  The China Factor 
Those opposed to missile defense because of its negative effects on Japanese 
relations with China cite the potentially destabilizing nature of a missile defense which 
would necessitate an arms race in the region and send incorrect signals of Japanese 
militarism.  They would also point to the lack of flexibility it would give their relations 
with China and the possible involvement in a conflict due to United States policy in the 
region.  Lastly, they believe stable relations with China are conducive to business 
relations between the two countries.  Advocates of missile defense feel the issue of 
China’s response is becoming less relevant as the more Beijing links Japanese missile 
defense with a threat to China’s nuclear deterrent, the more Japanese feel it is being 
targeted at them.167  Advocates also tend to be nationalistic and view an oncoming 
struggle with China for future economic leadership of the Asian region as inevitable.  
Current policymakers seem to view China’s missiles as a threat to Japan as evidenced by 
stating it specifically in the National Defense Program Outline for 2005-2009.168 
15.  The North Korea Factor 
North Korea’s launching of a Taepodong missile in August 1998 and continual 
nuclear weapons development has probably contributed the most towards acceptance of a 
Japanese missile defense system.  It has prompted support for joint research and 
development of the system and indigenous satellite monitoring systems.  It also allows 
Japanese policymakers to clothe the issue in terms of a North Korean missile threat rather 
than confronting directly the issue of the Chinese missile threat, even though there are 
moves towards this direction.  In the public’s eye, it is North Korea that embodies the 
danger from which a missile defense system needs to shield Japan.  As long as six-party 
talks remain more or less at an impasse, advocates of missile defense can always cite 
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North Korea as an urgent threat to push forward the debate in favor of continued 
cooperation with the United States. 
As a whole, opposition to Japanese missile defense internally still remains on the 
basis of largely financial and legal constraints, technical feasibility and industrial 
considerations and the issue of China’s response.  Financial constraints are mitigated by 
joint projects with the United States while industrial considerations are used to shape 
which areas Japan will cooperate in.  As the threat environment in the region increases, 
Japan will most likely continue its trend of gradually bending and changing rules to suit 
its needs with public opinion, with concern over developments in North Korea providing 
some justification.  
G. TRENDS AND SUMMARY 
The debate over missile defense and cooperation with the United States mirrors 
similar trends in other security issues, such as the expansion of SDF defense roles and 
capabilities.  There has been a steady advance towards participation and closer ties with 
the United States on this issue with large changes prompted by outside events.  For 
missile defense, the primary mover has always been the perceptions of a North Korean 
missile threat combined with Prime Minister Koizumi’s foreign policy of alignment with 
Washington in the pursuit of close relations.  While significant legal questions are still 
raised by Japanese participation in missile defense, many of these questions have either 
been sidestepped or dealt with directly in favor of continued cooperation.  Devoid of any 
changes in government, the likely trend for the future will be increased Japanese 















V. REGIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
JAPANESE TMD  
A. SOUTH KOREA 
South Korea opted out of participating in TMD in 1999.  Seoul assented to the 
deployment of PAC-2 and PAC-3 missile batteries to strategic locations within South 
Korea but does not want to participate in TMD architecture for several reasons.169  Key 
to South Korean concerns is the fear TMD will provoke an arms race with North Korea 
and hurt chances of a peaceful reunification and “soft landing” in the near future.  TMD 
is viewed as an issue which will only slow the reduction of tensions on the Korean 
peninsula.  Seoul must also take into consideration Beijing’s objections to TMD and 
future relations with China.  At the most basic level, South Korea sees little need for 
TMD because even if the North Korean missile threat was completely neutralized, it 
would offer no help against the preponderance of artillery targeted against Seoul and 
other population areas.170 
Another factor in South Korea’s perceptions of a Japanese TMD is distrust of 
Japan itself.  With national memory constantly dwelling on past Japanese militarism and 
colonization of Korea, this distrust is not altogether unexpected.  Recognition of Japanese 
anxiety created by North Korea’s actions leads some to speculate Japan may seek to 
acquire nuclear weapons of its own.171  Combined with a missile defense, it would give 
Japan defense, double deterrence from Japanese and United States nuclear weapons, and 
a strike capability which would be very destabilizing in the region.  At the very least, it 
would give Japan more leverage in contentious issues like ownership of the 
Takeshima/Tokdo islands.  Further still, there are those in South Korea who hope to see a 
unified Korea which inherits North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
                                                 
169 Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology, 1990-2003. 
170 Jae Ho Chung, “South Korea Between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic 
Dilemma,” Asian Survey Vol. 41, no. 5 (Sep. – Oct., 2001): 777-780, 794. 
171 Michael H. Armacost, “Japan: Tilting Closer to Washington,” 90-91. 
74 
capability.172  A TMD would do much to neutralize any newfound benefit gained in this 
manner. 
South Korea’s response to a fully developed Japanese TMD will most likely be 
one of denunciation, resigned acceptance, or tacit approval.  South Korean response 
hinges mainly on how it would affect the North Korean reunification dialogues and the 
security situation.  Should TMD be a major impediment to dialogue, South Korea would 
criticize the United States and Japanese decision.  However, since South Korean security 
depends on the United States, any such criticism would be muted unless counterbalanced 
by strong influence from China’s position.  The more hostilities seem likely, the more 
support for TMD will develop within South Korea but it is unlikely to be manifested in 
strong public statements.173 
B. CHINA 
China’s position on TMD is strong, open opposition while quietly researching its 
own missile defense capabilities.  The basis for China’s sentiment is multi-fold.  First, 
Chinese analysts publicly cite the destabilizing nature of a missile defense because it 
would neutralize China’s second strike capability, subjecting them to “nuclear blackmail” 
and causing an unnecessary arms race focused on Chinese modernization to their missile 
program.  A second concern is the prospects of China’s military modernization, which 
includes a concerted drive towards missile enhancement, the change from liquid to solid 
rocket fuel for reduced launch time, more precise guidance systems, mobile launch 
platforms and missile defense countermeasures that began in the 1980s.  China views its 
ballistic missile program as an integral part of all levels of military force rather than 
solely the delivery of WMD.  Should these efforts be neutralized or abandoned, it would 
represent a significant lost opportunity cost.  Furthermore, the more measures China has 
to undergo to make a TMD-resistant missile force, the more its actions will alarm its 
neighbors.174 
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As such, China could pursue an option of “small but modern” nuclear force which 
would depend upon a limited number of nuclear missiles with the capability to outsmart 
or outperform any missile defense system employed in the region.  This would represent 
a continuation of China’s “uncertainty principle” where a lack of knowledge about the 
survivability of China’s missile forces would deter actions to destroy them or at the very 
least offer some deterrence to American or Japanese forces from intervening in military 
action where the threat and costs of Chinese missile retaliation would be high.  This 
would include the use of Multiple Re-entry Vehicles (MRV’s), Multiple Independently 
Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV’s), decoys, chaff or detection-resistant material and 
design meant to overcome ballistic missile defense systems.  It would also include the use 
of mobile, non-silo launch vehicles, camouflage and other techniques designed to 
increase their survivability.175 
“Assured minimum deterrence” would require not only a modernization and 
increase in the effectiveness of existing ballistic missiles but also an increase in their 
number to overcome a layered missile defense system.  This method would operate not 
only on the “uncertainty principle”, but have the added dimension of quantity to increase 
its deterrence value.  In order to be effective, China would have to acknowledge 
possession of more than a small quantity of missiles and run the risk of being perceived 
as provoking an arms race by the rest of Asia.176 
Yet another strategy would be “limited nuclear deterrence” and would represent a 
shift from a minimal number of nuclear missiles to discourage a nuclear strike towards a 
larger, more comprehensive ability to wage nuclear war.  While still not an attempt to 
match a United States nuclear force level, it would be a step beyond assured minimum 
deterrence due to the sheer number of missiles required.  It would certainly raise warning 
flags all across the region as a sign of Chinese belligerency despite any Chinese 
arguments which would blame TMD.  The expense in political capital as well as 
monetary would make this a costly option for Beijing.177 
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While Beijing may have concerns over TMD reducing Chinese leverage against 
possible United States action in Asia, there are also fears of it contributing to a 
militarization of Japan.  The common reference to TMD being a shield against other 
countries’ nuclear weapons have led many analysts to point to the possibility of Japan 
developing the “sword” of nuclear weapons for themselves.  Despite being in compliance 
with the IAEA’s safeguard standards and signatories of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty 
and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Japan has the ability to quickly develop nuclear 
weapons should it choose to do so.  Therefore Chinese analysts criticize Japanese 
participation in TMD as a two-fold approach to gain missile technology to be employed 
in nuclear weapons while at the same time neutralizing the nuclear deterrents of its 
neighbors.178  Regardless of how urgent Beijing feels this danger is or how realistic, it 
offers a convenient excuse for the modernization of its missile force much in the same 
way North Korea’s actions provides a convenient excuse for Japan to implement missile 
defense. 
China will try to capitalize on Washington and Tokyo’s efforts to implement a 
TMD in Northeast Asia, saying justification based on North Korean action is only an 
excuse to develop a capability that threatens China’s nuclear deterrent.  Beijing will 
continue to use TMD technology transfers to Taiwan from Washington as one 
justification for increasing its missile modernization efforts.  Should Taiwan gain an 
ability to neutralize the Chinese ballistic missile capability or gain too much confidence 
from a TMD program, China would feel endangered in regards to reunification efforts.179  
TMD will lead to a straining of relationships between Japan and China, although this will 
most likely be in the context of already existing competition for influence in Asia.  
Consequently, China will attempt to use this issue to woo countries like South Korea 
away from ambivalent cooperation with Japan and the United States. 
C. TAIWAN 
Taiwan is a strong supporter of TMD in Northeast Asia because Taipei can use it 
to its advantage despite Washington’s doctrine of strategic ambiguity.  It welcomes any 
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development which would enhance the amount of military aid in the event of an attempt 
to forcefully reunite the island with the mainland.  As much as possible, it wishes to 
create the perception of increased American support for Taiwan in the eyes of Beijing in 
hopes of deterring any such contingency. 
Taiwan has repeatedly requested the purchase of PAC-3 and Aegis cruisers in the 
past although Washington has delayed its consideration of sales.  Currently, the plan is to 
allow Taiwan the purchase of six batteries of PAC-3 missiles, with four launchers per 
battery and 16 interceptors per launcher by the year 2019 despite Taiwan’s requests for a 
faster plan of implementation.180  Taiwan’s main interest is lower tier terminal phase 
defense capability in the form of the PAC-3 with some midcourse phase defense 
capabilities in the form of the Aegis SM-3 due to the short and medium range missiles 
aimed at the island.  The acquisition of missile defense capabilities also serves as an 
opportunity for Taiwan to upgrade its C3I architecture, early warning and air defense 
capabilities.  At the same time, there is concern that gaining too much missile defense 
capability would spur China into preemptive action in order to resolve the issue before 
Taiwan actually gains the ability to withstand a large attack from the mainland.  Although 
perhaps an unrealistic hope, there are also those who see TMD as a way to reduce the 
concept of strategic ambiguity and increase the proximity between Washington and 
Taipei.181  A Japanese TMD does not necessarily mean it will be obligated to defend 
Taiwan although both proponents for and against TMD in Japan are highly aware of this 
possibility.  As such, Taiwan will try to be involved in any BMD efforts in the region and 
could be seen as a constraint on Japanese defense policy.182   
D. NORTH KOREA 
North Korea is obviously against the development of any BMD capability.  North 
Korea’s missile program serves several purposes including the preservation of Kim Jong 
Il’s regime, a source of revenue in arms sales, and potential deterrent once its longer 
range missiles are operational and equipped with WMD.  North Korean response to a 
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TMD would entail a costly arms race, a sell-out option where the United States would 
buy up North Korea’s missile program, or the pursuit of alternate delivery systems.183  
Most likely Pyongyang will seek alternate delivery systems while continuing its rhetoric 
that the United States is merely trying to nullify North Korea’s deterrent and attempt 
regime change.   
Despite the fact TMD gained impetus in Northeast Asia as a direct result of North 
Korea’s weapons programs, North Korea will attempt to use it to bolster its bargaining 
position vis-à-vis South Korea and China.  Pyongyang echoes similar sentiments by 
China regarding Japan’s possible militarism and pursuit of nuclear weapons in addition to 
missile defense.  It is highly unlikely North Korea could maintain an arms race with the 
United States and Japan so a capable TMD could serve the purpose of neutralizing 
Pyongyang’s attempts at hostage diplomacy in northeast Asia. 
E. RUSSIA 
Russia’s position towards TMD and NMD has traditionally been antagonistic, 
citing the dangers of abrogating the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) as being 
dangerous to both United States and Russian security interests.  However, after the Bush 
administration announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Moscow expressed 
disappointment yet stated it was not a threat to Russian security interests and cooperation 
regarding nonproliferation and arms reduction with the United States would continue.184  
Moscow seems to be concerned more with NMD rather than TMD and even then does 
not consider it capable of neutralizing Russia’s nuclear capability.  Interestingly enough, 
Russia has begun to advocate a European TMD and the NATO-Russia TMD Ad Hoc 
Working Group participated in its first exercise in Colorado Springs, Colorado in March 
2004.185  Russia seems poised to take advantage of any political leeway gained from 
opposition or support of TMD and modernization of missile and missile defense 
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technology as an outgrowth of cooperative missile defense efforts.  Japan would not 
consider these actions posing any strategic threat to its security. 
With specific regards to Japan possessing a missile defense, Russia has very little 
to be concerned about.  The likelihood of Japan developing a missile defense capability 
strong enough to defend against a Russian attack is practically zero while it would have 
to go to extreme lengths to even come close to achieving parity with the Russian nuclear 
arsenal should it choose to develop such a capability.  Russia stands to gain from cordial 
relations with Japan, provided they do not hinder relations with China, and apart from 
territorial disputes of the Kurile Islands, there is little contention between the two 
countries.  All the same, Russia benefits most from a stable status quo where it is able to 
play one Asian country off the other.  Consequently, it may choose to voice muted 
criticism if it deems TMD too destabilizing in the region.186 
F.  UNITED STATES 
The United States has a direct interest in the peace and security of the East Asian 
region.  Regional stability promotes economic prosperity, strengthening ties between the 
United States and its trading partners.  Economic prosperity encourages openness of 
countries’ economic systems which in turn encourages political openness and the spread 
of freedom throughout the area.  The spread of freedom and wealth drives opposition to 
authoritarianism, increased awareness of the responsibilities of governments to ensure 
basic human rights and in full circle, enhances peace and security in the East Asian 
region.  To maintain this stability, the United States actively works in the region through 
its projection of economic, political and military presence to deter aggression and 
promote integration. 
As the closest U.S. strategic ally in the East Asian region, the status of Japan’s 
Self Defense Force has important implications for burden-sharing.  As Japan continues its 
eventual progression towards a military capacity unconstrained by its past and consistent 
with its economic and political power, one of the possible policy options includes a 
ballistic missile defense against nuclear and other threats posed either by North Korea or 
China.  The ballistic missile defense option is one advocated by the current Bush 
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administration as part of a broader campaign of counter-proliferation and non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons technology and delivery systems that pose a threat to the 
United States and its allies.   
Any Japanese decision regarding a ballistic missile defense system will have 
important ramifications for the U.S. – Japan security relationship and the bilateral 
relationships of each country with other nations in the region.  How their decision 
regarding missile defense fits into their legal framework and interpretation thereof will 
have increasing relevance as calls for constitutional revision continue to increase.  In an 
atmosphere highlighted by the North Korean nuclear program and increasing Chinese 
power, especial attention must be paid to the changing security dynamics and the role of 
Japan in its partnership with the United States in the region. 
The current Bush administration fully supports Japan’s TMD cooperation.  
Utilizing synergy between the alliance management, Japanese concerns over North 
Korean belligerence, pushes for a more defense-related role and image by the JDA, and 
Japan’s defense industry’s interests, TMD is now seen as method of strengthening the ties 
between Tokyo and Washington rather than an item of contention.  Implementation poses 
an excellent opportunity for increased integration of United States and Japan’s military 
forces to allow a “force transformation” to a smaller and more capable Japanese Self 
Defense Force in accordance with the JDA’s National Defense Program Guidelines.  It 
also enables the maintenance of the U.S. interest in providing a security umbrella for 
Japan. 
There is some concern over how the Chinese will react to a fully implemented 
missile defense system in the region.  The powerful business lobby favors stability in the 
region and a furtherance of trade with China, some seeing missile defense as possibly 
jeopardizing the relationship.  Others see missile defense as initiating an unnecessary 
arms race in the region and point to China’s missile modernization efforts as justification 
of their fears.  Detractors from this view counter that Chinese missile modernization 
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efforts have not correlated with the status of the missile defense debate in the United 
States.187   
The importance of the Chinese reaction is in tension with perception of a threat 
from North Korea and the extent to which China is viewed as an inevitable strategic 
competitor.  Missile defense is seen as a way to weaken North Korea’s bargaining 
position by removing much of its “hostage diplomacy” power.  As the North Korean 
missile program is also a source of revenue, it is seen as a method to decrease the 
viability of the Kim Jong Il regime.  Strategic competition with China is seen as the likely 
outcome in the future or even the present state by some advocates, even without the 
implementation of a missile defense.  This is not to say holders of this view are 
indifferent to security-related tension with China; only that they tend to view it as an 
acceptable consequence.  This does cause some problems for U.S.-South Korean 
relations, as the Seoul’s view at many times regarding the approach towards the North 
Korean nuclear crisis finds more similarity with Beijing’s than it does with 
Washington’s. 
G.  TRENDS AND SUMMARY 
Taking into consideration the gains and losses to be had from implementing a 
TMD, Japan should continue along its current path of joint research and development to 
aid United States efforts for a Northeast Asia TMD.  North Korea is a strong opponent of 
a TMD, China has serious concerns about the neutralization of its limited deterrent, and 
South Korea is opposed to it on the grounds it would hurt relations with North Korea.  
The missile threat from North Korea has demonstrably been unable to be resolved 
through talks, promises and incentives.  Should the current crisis be resolved, it is highly 
probable North Korea would pursue the same course of action after continual rewarding 
of “bad behavior.”  Moreover, North Korean actions in recent years have thoroughly 
convinced policy makers of Japanese vulnerability to North Korean aggression without a 
missile defense. 
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While China asserts a TMD is necessitating an arms race, it is naïve to believe 
Beijing’s missile modernization efforts would not be occurring in the absence of a TMD 
system.  Furthermore, conflict between China and Japan is likely in the future as both 
countries attempt to gain regional leadership, both politically and economically.  Russia 
remains rather ambivalent towards a system, feeling no threat of a possible neutralization 
of its strategic nuclear force and has participated in joint studies of the issue.  The United 
States remains a firm backer of TMD and sees it as a way to limit North Korean 
bargaining power.  Beijing believes Washington is merely using North Korea as an 
excuse for TMD with China being the real target.  Washington remains aware of 
Beijing’s concerns and stresses the limited nature of its intent and target, which is not 
China.  To ease Beijing’s fears, there must be an open dialogue regarding missile defense 






VI.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine both the debate driving missile defense in 
Japan and the implications of implementation.  The United States has a direct interest in 
this issue as it is the position of the current administration to back missile defense 
cooperation in East Asia.  Furthermore, Japan is a staunch ally of the United States, not 
only in the region, but also as a global partner.  This has important consequences for 
burden-sharing, alliance management, and regional policy. 
The background of Japanese security decisions following the Second World War 
in general and the debates regarding ballistic missile defense specifically were studied to 
understand these consequences.  A brief overview of the expansion of the roles and 
capabilities of the Japanese Self Defense Forces and Japanese-United States relations was 
undertaken to understand important trends necessary for establishing the context of the 
missile defense debate.  Key actors, issues and events in the missile defense debate were 
then discussed to identify trends and their implications.  Regional perceptions of a missile 
defense in the region with Japanese participation were analyzed to understand how they 
will affect the U.S.-Japan security relationship and U.S. interests in the area. 
A.  TRENDS 
Three major inter-related trends reveal themselves over the course of Japanese 
post-Cold War Self Defense Force evolution, relations with the United States and the 
debate over missile defense.  These include the willingness to relax legal considerations 
in the face of political necessity, the gradual expansion of the roles and capabilities of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces, and the responsiveness of Japanese decision makers to 
external factors, including most noticeably the security relationship with the United 
States and the threat from North Korea. 
The adoption of a full-scale TMD by Japan would be yet another step in the 
gradual process of expanding the legal and technical capabilities of the JSDF, especially 
in the last fifteen years.  It brings Japan even closer to forcing a decision on constitutional 
revision the more it bends its legal framework to allow for changes in policy dealing 
largely with collective security issues.  As seen over these years, nearly all changes in 
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policy have been moving away from a “peace constitution”.  This represents a shift 
towards a more military-based security outlook in contrast to the traditional postwar 
doctrine of comprehensive security where diplomatic and economic power was also seen 
as tools to enhance Japanese security.  The more steps taken in this direction, the more 
Japan’s neighbors fear the resurgence of a military Japan.  However, it is unfair to expect 
Japan to accept a permanent official renunciation of its military.  In light of recent legal 
developments, it would be more conducive for regional relations if Japan formally 
adopted a legal structure recognizing the status of its military, even if this means 
amending the Japanese constitution.  This would demonstrate more respect for the rule of 
law than simply reinterpreting the framework to meet present needs. 
The major legal dilemmas encountered by Japanese policy makers regarding its 
Self Defense Forces and capabilities have usually all been in response to external factors, 
notably the issue of alliance maintenance with the United States and the North Korean 
missile threat.  Overall, there has been a steady advance towards participation and closer 
ties with the United States on this issue with large changes prompted by outside events, 
including U.S. disappointment with the Japanese responses to the First Gulf War and the 
first North Korean nuclear crisis, growing Chinese missile capabilities, and the 1998 
Taepodong missile launch combined with the recent round of North Korean nuclear 
weapons programs.  For missile defense, the primary mover has always been the 
perceptions of a North Korean missile threat combined with Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
foreign policy of alignment with Washington in the pursuit of close relations.  Internally, 
support for missile defense has grown from synergy between the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Prime Minister Koizumi’s support for the United States, popular support for a 
hard-line stance on North Korea, perceptions of North Korean threat, support by various 
defense industries, and support from the JDA due to the ability of missile defense to 
provide it with a more concrete image of serving in defense of the Japanese nation. While 
significant legal questions are still raised by Japanese participation in missile defense, 
many of these questions have either been sidestepped or dealt with directly in favor of 
continued cooperation. 
Even should the technical merits of TMD prove lacking, Japan can still rely upon 
the deterrence offered by the United States massive nuclear deterrence, although this is 
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nowhere near as psychologically reassuring to decision makers or the Japanese public.  In 
addition, Japanese pursuit of the option gives them leverage in host-nation support 
matters, especially basing support in Okinawa, a long-time contentious issue.  As long as 
the North Korean threat and alliance maintenance with the United States remain 
important in the eyes of policy makers, missile defense will proceed forward. 
B.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES POLICY 
1.  Possible Policy Options 
 As the full implementation of a theater missile defense system appears to be a 
matter of time rather than political will on the part of Japan, there are several broad 
policy options the United States can pursue.  These include an abandonment of missile 
defense, a very aggressive pursuit of missile defense, or a more balanced and limited 
approach towards missile defense capability in East Asia. 
a. Abandonment of Missile Defense Efforts in the Region 
The first policy option is for the United States to reverse its position on 
theater missile defense.  Should Taiwan or Japan wish to continue their pursuit of a 
ballistic missile defense system, they would have to do so independently of the United 
States.  If any missile defense system remains, it would be purely of a tactical nature 
designed to protect American troops rather than defend large areas against missile 
attacks. 
b.  Aggressive Pursuit of Missile Defense in the Region 
The second policy option is for the United States to aggressively pursue 
theater missile defense cooperation in the region as part of a broader continuation of a 
hard stance against North Korea and containment of China.  Weakening of relations 
between China and the United States from this action would be acceptable as part of a 
larger strategic stance. 
c.  Balanced and Limited Pursuit of Missile Defense in the Region 
The third policy option is for the United States to continue its pursuit of a 
theater missile defense capability to deter North Korean and Chinese missile threats while 
still trying to foster closer relations with the Chinese.  The United States and its allies 
would prepare against military action in the region by either North Korea or China yet 
still promote economic and political ties with China.  A level of open dialogue between 
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China and the United States on the issue of missile defense to ensure either side does not 
pose a significant threat to the other. 
2.  Recommended Course of Action 
The United States should pursue the third policy option of promoting defense 
cooperation while pursuing amicable relations with China.  The risks of an unmitigated 
missile attack against United States personnel and their families stationed overseas as 
well as the fate of host nations require the United States to do its best to deter such 
attacks and reduce their impact should they occur.  The first policy option would deny the 
United States the ability to protect these individuals on any large-scale basis.  
Furthermore, the likelihood of developing more workable systems is sharply reduced if 
the emphasis on joint cooperation, research and development is removed.  Such a move 
would result in budget cuts and the technology would suffer.  In effect, even limited 
missile defense efforts on the tactical level would be greatly hindered.   
Politically, it would remove a strong playing card by the United States in 
negotiations with North Korea.  A missile defense system is necessary to counter the 
aggressive actions of North Korea, which are at odds with the desire of the United States 
and the other nations in the region for regional stability and economic prosperity on the 
international level.  Continually giving in to North Korean demands because there is no 
other option is merely rewarding bad behavior.  Giving up the option of missile defense 
after taking many steps to push it through would indicate a wavering stance on policy and 
could hurt negotiating rather than help it.  A theater missile defense would serve to 
strengthen regional allies against acts of aggression through enhanced defense rather than 
offensive arms buildup. The interests of the United States are best served through 
deterring threats to stability while encouraging cooperation, stability and economic ties 
between countries of the region.   
However, the third policy option is more desirable than the second.  Theater 
missile defense is not predicated on a notion of hostility and can be pursued in 
conjunction with amicable relations.  Essential to this strategy is the emphasis on the 
limited nature of a missile defense capability.  Pursuing too strong a capability would 
justify Chinese fears of their nuclear deterrent being neutralized and could possibly result 
in a destabilizing arms race in the region.  To assuage Chinese fears, there must be a level 
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of open dialogue regarding the strength of missile defense and its capacity.  In a similar 
manner to China’s nuclear deterrent operating on an “uncertainty principle”, a country’s 
missile defense capabilities have an element of uncertainty of effectiveness based on 
incomplete information.  A country would be hesitant to attack another if the status of the 
defending country’s nuclear survivability based on arsenal size and technology was 
unknown.  By the same token, a country would be hesitant to attack another if the general 
level of the defending country’s missile defense was known, but not in detail.  Therefore 
a balance must be struck between assuring the Chinese their limited nuclear deterrence is 
not neutralized, while maintaining a level of secrecy necessary for the uncertainty 
principle to work.  Much of this uncertainty is directed not at the Chinese themselves, but 
at other countries or actors who would use the information to their advantage.  Excessive 
openness would result in merely setting a bar for other nations to work towards and 
overcome.  A primary method of achieving this beneficial uncertainty is sharing general 
information on the strategic level while being open on the tactical and deployment level 
of missile defense in East Asia.  For example, a movement of U.S. AEGIS cruisers 
equipped with missile defense capacity now has the added dimension of not only an 
increased combat presence, but an increased missile defense presence as well.  When 
moving through locations closer to Chinese missile sites, they would represent a 
heightened threat to the Chinese nuclear deterrent in addition to regular combat 
capability.  Consequently, openness between the United States military and the Chinese 
military is essential to mitigate Chinese concerns, as perception dictates policy rather 
than reality. 
To serve the interests of the United States, Washington should pursue a balanced 
missile defense plan in East Asia.  This promotes increasing defense cooperation with 
Japan, fostering stronger ties between the two nations.  As one of the United States’ 
staunchest allies, Japan is a strong partner in a mutually beneficial relationship.  It also 
provides the prospect of safety for military personnel and their families overseas in the 
event of a missile attack, something which is only available on a limited level for only 
military personnel.  It gives the United States a strong bargaining position with North 
Korea and discourages proliferation.  While the Chinese reaction must be considered, it 
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can be calmed through open discussion of missile defense and military-to-military 
contact between China and the United States. 
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